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PATENTS, DISCLOSURE, AND BIOPIRACY 
AMAN GEBRU† 
ABSTRACT 
One of the core requirements of patentability is that patent applicants 
provide background and contextual information about their invention to 
the patent office. This disclosure is expected to allow a patent examiner to 
ensure that the application meets patentability standards. However, be-
cause of the information asymmetry between expert patent applicants and 
generalist patent examiners, applicants can withhold useful information 
while still receiving the benefits of exclusive patent rights. While this is a 
problem in the patent system in general, the challenge is even worse in a 
subset of inventions. The information asymmetry is more pronounced in 
cases of inventions that rely on the genetic resource or traditional 
knowledge (TK) of indigenous peoples and local communities in their re-
search. A good example is the practice of using traditional medicinal 
knowledge as research leads to develop modern drugs. Aspirin is one of 
the drugs developed out of traditional practices. A core question in these 
situations is whether patent applicants that rely on TK to develop their 
invention are required to disclose such information to the patent examiner. 
Reports of multiple instances show that patent applicants usually withhold 
information about their reliance on TK in their inventive process. As a 
result, they may claim exclusive property rights over what source commu-
nities have been practicing for generations. In reaction to the lack of recog-
nition of their contribution, source communities are adopting a protection-
ist trend by creating restrictions on access to their resources. 
This Article argues that the introduction of an explicit requirement in 
U.S. patent law, compelling patent applicants to disclose their use of TK, 
can create an efficient patent system and sustainable relationships in the 
relevant industries. It provides two justifications for the amendment of 
U.S. patent law. First, the Article makes a normative case for conceiving 
the disclosure of origin requirement as an information-forcing rule. Im-
posing an obligation to disclose the source of TK would elicit socially ben-
eficial information about the validity and scope of a claimed application 
from the low-cost providers—patent applicants—thereby creating a more 
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efficient patent system. Second, the Article argues that an explicit and en-
forceable disclosure requirement would reverse the inefficient and trou-
bling protectionist trend by facilitating the tracking and enforcement of 
obligations that researchers may have in contracts with source communi-
ties or domestic laws of source countries. The requirement will create con-
fidence in the patent system and encourage source communities to facili-
tate access to TK. The Article uses efficiency and social-welfare perspec-
tives in contrast to the equity and distributive justice justifications domi-
nating the literature. The focus of this Article on domestic U.S. law is an-
other point of contrast to the focus of the literature on international law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 1985, Robert Larson, a timber importer based in Sheboygan, Wis-
consin, received U.S. Patent 4,556,562 for a storage stable neem tree ex-
tract and the process of making such extract to be used as a pesticide.1 Mr. 
Larson imported samples of the tree and researched its pesticidal qualities 
for over a decade.2 Three years after his patent was granted, he assigned 
the patent rights to the chemical conglomerate W.R. Grace,3 which had 
received similar patents on a storage stable neem tree extract in the United 
States4 and other jurisdictions.5 Neemix, the pesticide that W.R. Grace de-
veloped using neem tree extract, grossed around $60 million in annual 
global sales.6 Mr. Larson had learned of the use of the neem trees as a 
pesticide while importing timber from India.7 Although farmers in India 
have been using the neem tree as a pesticide for centuries,8 Mr. Larson did 
not mention this fact or how he learned of the use of the neem tree as a 
pesticide in his patent application.9 When the granting of patent rights was 
disclosed to the public, many scholars, activists, farmers, and government 
leaders protested what they argued was a new form of imperialism and an 
act of “piracy by patents.”10 The public outcry resulted in the creation of 
an international coalition from thirty-five countries, and hundreds of sci-
entific and agricultural groups supported by over 100,000 Indian farmers 
brought a legal challenge at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO).11  
The legal petition alleged that W.R. Grace is holding a patent right 
over what Indian farmers have been doing for centuries. While there are 
philosophical objections against the granting of rights over life forms, on 
  
 1. Stable Anti-Pest Neem Seed Extract, U.S. Patent No. 4,556,562 (filed Mar. 19, 1984) (is-
sued Dec. 3, 1985). 
 2. Vandana Shiva, The Neem Tree—A Case History of Biopiracy, THIRD WORLD NETWORK, 
http://www.twn.my/title/pir-ch.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2019). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Storage Stable Azadirachtin Formulation, U.S. Patent No. 5,124,349 (filed Oct. 31, 1990) 
(issued Jun. 23, 1992). 
 5. See, e.g., Storage Stable Azadirachtin Formulation, Eur. Patent No. EP0405291 B1 (filed 
Dec. 20, 1990) (issued Jan. 2, 1991) (the European counterpart of the same patent application). 
 6. Mara Bovsun, FET Challenges U.S. Patent on India’s Natural Pesticide, BIOTECHNOLOGY 
NEWSWATCH, Sept. 18, 1995; Ralph T. King Jr., Grace’s Patent on a Pesticide Enrages Indians, 
WALL ST. J., Sept. 13, 1995, at B1. 
 7. Shiva, supra note 2. 
 8. BD. ON SCI. & TECH. FOR INT’L DEV., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, NEEM: A TREE FOR 
SOLVING GLOBAL PROBLEMS 32 (1992). 
 9. It should be noted here that at the time the Larson patent was examined, U.S. patent law did 
not consider unpublished information from outside of the United States for patentability analysis. The 
2011 America Invents Act has changed that, and under current law, unpublished information from 
anywhere in the world can be used in examining the validity of a patent application. Leahy-Smith 
America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29 § 3(b)(1), 125 Stat. 284, 285–87 (2011) (codified as amended 
at 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2018)). 
 10. Vandana Shiva & Radha Holla-Bhar, Piracy by Patent: The Case of the Neem Tree, in THE 
CASE AGAINST THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: AND FOR A TURN TOWARD THE LOCAL 146, 150–51 (Jerry 
Mander & Edward Goldsmith eds., 1996); Lori Wolfgang, Patents on Native Technology Challenged, 
269 SCI. 1506, 1506 (1995). 
 11. See Request for Reexamination of Patent No. 5,124,349, 1182 OFF. GAZ. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFFICE 536, 536–37 (1996). 
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a technical level, the challenge argued that the invention lacked novelty 
and was obvious considering traditional practices in India.12 W.R. Grace, 
on its part, claimed that the company’s research resulted in increasing the 
shelf life for the extract from a couple of days to about two years.13 The 
PTO agreed with W.R. Grace and found that the claimed invention had a 
significant level of advancement over the traditional practice and that it 
met the patentability requirement.14 The European counterpart patent was 
invalidated based on evidence showing a scientific project that disclosed 
a storage stable neem tree extract decades before the patent application.15  
An important point here is that, at the time the patent was granted, 
U.S. patent law did not consider unpublished information outside of the 
United States in patentability analysis.16 That has since changed with the 
amendments to the patent law in the 2011 America Invents Act (AIA).17 
Under current U.S. law, unpublished information, such as the public use 
of the invention, anywhere in the world can be used as a prior art18 refer-
ence against a claimed invention.19 This may include traditional practices 
such as the use of neem tree extracts as pesticides in India. However, be-
cause the relevance of traditional practices for patentability has not been 
litigated in court, it is still not clear if the challenge would have come out 
differently if filed today. In practice, patent examiners hardly consult un-
published sources that may disclose the claimed invention before the pa-
tent application. So, even after the AIA, an invention that relies on the oral 
history and traditional practices of indigenous and local communities 
could still be granted without the source information being considered in 
patentability analysis. In fact, the proposals in this Article are timely con-
  
 12. Id. 
 13. John F. Burns, Tradition in India vs. a Patent in the U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 15, 1995), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1995/09/15/business/international-business-tradition-in-india-vs-a-patent-
in-the-us.html. 
 14. See Stable Anti-Pest Neem Seed Extract, supra note 1. 
 15. Although there are differences in the patent laws of the United States and the European 
Union (EU), years of international patent law harmonization has resulted in very similar patent systems 
on patentability requirements with only a few differences between the two jurisdictions. One of the 
main tools through which patent laws have been harmonized internationally is the World Trade Or-
ganization’s (WTO) Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights Agreement. See Marrakesh Agree-
ment Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 3 (1994); India Wins 
Landmark Patent Battle, BBC, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/4333627.stm (last updated 
Mar. 9, 2005, 4:04 PM); Neem Tree Patent Revoked, BBC (May 11, 2000, 1:34 PM), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/745028.stm. 
 16. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2018); Margo A. Bagley, Patently Unconstitutional: The Geograph-
ical Limitation on Prior Art in a Small World, 87 MINN. L. REV. 679, 680–83 (2002). 
 17. The AIA was passed by Congress and signed into law by President Barack Obama in Sep-
tember 2011. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011). 
 18. Simply stated, prior art is any acceptable evidence that the claimed invention was known or 
used by someone other than the patent applicant prior to the patent application. One of the key sections 
of the Patent Act that describes prior art states that an invention would not be patentable if it was 
“described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public before 
the effective filing date of the claimed invention.” See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1). 
 19. Id. 
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sidering the AIA reforms. While the AIA has expanded the body of rele-
vant prior art references to cover undocumented knowledge outside of the 
United States, patent examiners have no realistic way of accessing undoc-
umented TK in other jurisdictions. In this sense, the disclosure require-
ment outlined in this Article is necessary to bring meaning to the AIA’s 
expansion of prior art.  
There are several cases where patent applicants relied on the genetic 
resource and TK of indigenous peoples and local communities and failed 
to disclose the source of the information.20 The term genetic resources re-
fers to “any material of plant, animal, microbial or other origin containing 
functional units of heredity,”21 while the term “traditional knowledge” re-
fers to the know-how, skills, innovations, and practices of indigenous peo-
ples and local communities.22 For the sake of brevity, both genetic re-
sources and traditional knowledge will be referred to as “traditional 
knowledge” or “TK” for short.23 The term “indigenous peoples” refers to 
native communities that reside with settler communities in physical or cul-
tural enclaves, while “local communities” refers to traditional communi-
ties outside of the mainstream culture that reside in countries from which 
colonizing powers have left. The practice of using traditional medicinal 
knowledge as research leads to develop modern drugs is called bio-
prospecting, ethnopharmacology, or ethnomedicine, and most discussions 
around TK deal with these types of relationships.24 Reliance on TK in the 
inventive process creates questions of patent validity, duty of disclosure, 
and entitlement to creative outcomes.  
This Article proposes an amendment to U.S. patent law, which intro-
duces an explicit obligation that patent applicants disclose the source of 
  
 20. Other examples include: a patent right for the use of turmeric powder for wound healing, a 
practice widely used in Indian communities; a patent right over an appetite-suppressant compound 
extracted from the Hoodia tree, a practice used by the San People of South Africa for centuries; and a 
patent right over a process of producing teff flour, a famous ingredient used to make injera bread by 
millions of Ethiopians. For a non-exhaustive list of cases in which patent rights were accused of bio-
piracy, see JAY MCGOWAN, OUT OF AFRICA: MYSTERIES OF ACCESS AND BENEFIT SHARING, at i (Ed-
monds Inst., 2006); DANIEL F. ROBINSON, CONFRONTING BIOPIRACY: CHALLENGES, CASES AND 
INTERNATIONAL DEBATES 45–76 (2010); see generally ABENA DOVE AGYEPOMA OSSEO-ASSARE, 
BITTER ROOTS: THE SEARCH FOR HEALING PLANTS IN AFRICA (2014) (discussing five major cases of 
biopiracy arising from the African continent). 
 21. See Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 143, 146. 
 22. This definition is a narrow one and used to facilitate a pointed discussion about know-how 
of indigenous peoples and local communities. However, the definition of the term is highly conten-
tious, and varied forms of definitions are used in the scholarship and in international deliberations. See 
Aman Gebru, International Intellectual Property Law and the Protection of Traditional Knowledge: 
From Cultural Conservation to Knowledge Codification, 15 ASPER REV. INT’L BUS. & TRADE L. 294, 
330 (2015). 
 23. This Article is not the first one to use the term TK to refer to traditional knowledge and 
genetic resources. Some scholars have used the term TK to collectively refer to genetic resources, 
traditional knowledge, and traditional cultural expressions. See CHIDI OGUAMANAM, INTERNATIONAL 
LAW AND INDIGENOUS KNOWLEDGE: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, PLANT BIODIVERSITY, AND 
TRADITIONAL MEDICINE 172–76 (2d ed. 2006). 
 24. See Thomas Efferth & Henry Johannes Greten, Traditional Medicine with Plants—Present 
and Past, MED. & AROMATIC PLANTS, May 25, 2014, at 1, 1. 
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TK on which they rely. Such a requirement will facilitate sustainable rela-
tionships in industries that rely on TK and will create a more efficient pa-
tent system. The Article reaches this conclusion from a welfarist point of 
view, as opposed to the equity and distributive justice perspective that 
dominates the literature in this field of patents and TK. In doing so, I hope 
to engage a broader set of stakeholders beyond those interested in equity 
and distributive justice.  
The Article relates the issues to a core mission of U.S. patent law: 
disclosure.25 U.S. patent law grants exclusive rights to individuals that de-
velop inventive products or processes. A key aspect of the system is a quid 
pro quo26—a social compact—in which inventors receive exclusive rights 
for twenty years in exchange for disclosing their inventions to the public.27 
This social compact faces a risk because patent applicants have both the 
motive and the opportunity to withhold essential information.28 They have 
the motive because the validity and scope of a patent right depends on the 
level of information available to a patent examiner, and they have an in-
terest to withhold potentially damaging information. Patent applicants 
have the opportunity because there is considerable information asymmetry 
in patent examination.29 Most of the information used by patent examiners 
tends to be provided by patent applicants who have more information 
about the invention than the examiner could develop during the limited 
period of examination.30 
To guard against this incentive to withhold information, the patent 
system includes obligations to disclose background and contextual infor-
mation about the claimed invention.31 Despite these measures, applicants 
use drafting techniques to receive rights over unpatentable inventions or 
to get vague patent rights that create a broader scope than the invention 
deserves.32 Several scholars have reported this problem of withholding 
information to receive patent rights for undeserving claims.33 This prob-
lem, however, is exacerbated in inventions that rely on TK. Because, un-
like other prior art references, TK resources are undocumented or are doc-
umented in foreign languages, examiners rarely use such resources in 
  
 25. See Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539, 560–62 (2009). 
 26. See United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 186–87 (1933). 
 27. Jacob Adam Schroeder, Written Description: Protecting the Quid Pro Quo Since 1793, 21 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 63, 85 (2010). 
 28. See infra Section III.A.1 on information-forcing rules in patent law. 
 29. R. Polk Wagner, Reconsidering Estoppel: Patent Administration and the Failure of Festo, 
151 U. PA. L. REV. 159, 218–19 (2002). 
 30. See Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 
1499–1500 (2001). 
 31. See Dan L. Burk, The Role of Patent Law in Knowledge Codification, 23 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 1009, 1021 (2008). 
 32. John R. Thomas, Of Text, Technique, and the Tangible: Drafting Patent Claims Around 
Patent Rules, 17 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO L. 219, 226, 231 (1998). 
 33. Katherine Nolan-Stevaux, Inequitable Conduct Claims in the 21st Century: Combating the 
Plague, 20 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 147, 147 (2005); Wagner, supra note 29, at 214. 
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patent examinations, which in turn increases the information asymmetry 
and the incentive to withhold information.  
Because U.S. patent law has a broad disclosure requirement,34 
arguably, patent applicants that rely on TK resources in the inventive pro-
cess must disclose such information. However, there is legal uncertainty 
surrounding the issue, especially about the level of reliance required to 
trigger the obligation. An explicit requirement of disclosing reliance on 
TK would remove doubts and provide better guidance for both researchers 
and source communities. Reports of multiple instances of biopiracy35 
show that patent applicants usually fail to disclose their reliance on TK in 
their inventive process, and it is only ex post when the patent is challenged 
that such information is disclosed. Patentees in the United States have re-
peatedly been accused of engaging in biopiracy—the act of applying for 
and receiving patent rights over TK without the knowledge or consent of 
the source community.36  
This Article argues that the heightened level of information asym-
metry calls for the introduction of an explicit requirement that patent ap-
plicants disclose the source of TK they use in their research. Disclosure of 
source is expected to include disclosure of the level of reliance on TK. For 
the sake of brevity, this requirement to disclose reliance on TK will be 
referred to as “the requirement” throughout this Article. The Article makes 
two arguments that should convince legislators and policy makers to in-
troduce such reform. First, the Article makes the normative case for con-
ceiving the requirement as an information-forcing rule. Understood this 
way, the benefits of the requirement are that it would elicit socially bene-
ficial information about the validity and scope of a claimed application 
from the low-cost providers of such information—patent applicants—
thereby creating a more efficient patent prosecution process. Full disclo-
sure of the prior art also helps ensure that only deserving inventions get a 
patent, and thus improves the quality of patents and reduces the social 
costs of meritless patents. Here, the Article builds on the literature exam-
ining the use of information-forcing rules to mitigate inefficiencies result-
ing from information asymmetry. 
Conceiving the requirement as an information-forcing rule provides 
key insights about the governance of TK use. It points to the need to es-
tablish a requirement to compel information from the well-informed 
  
 34. Jason Rantanen, Patent Law’s Disclosure Requirement, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 369, 370 
(2013). 
 35. ROBINSON, supra note 20. 
 36. The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines the term “biopiracy” as “the unethical or unlawful 
appropriation or commercial exploitation of biological materials (such as medicinal plant extracts) that 
are native to a particular country or territory without providing fair financial compensation to the peo-
ple or government of that country or territory.” Biopiracy, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.mer-
riam-webster.com/dictionary/biopiracy (last visited Mar. 22, 2019). This corresponds to the use of the 
term in the scholarships. Paul J. Heald, The Rhetoric of Biopiracy, 11 CARDOZO J. INT’L COMP. L. 
519, 521 (2003) (critiquing the use of the term “biopiracy”). 
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party37: the patent applicant. The information-forcing rule’s literature also 
suggests that the requirement should only require patent applicants to dis-
close the source from which they received TK and not the origin of the 
resource.38 Requiring inventors to conduct more research to discover the 
origin of TK would create new transaction costs that may discourage them 
from engaging in TK-related research in the first place.39 Furthermore, the 
literature also suggests that if the requirement is to provide its infor-
mation-forcing effect, the penalty for nondisclosure should be robust40 and 
include either a rejection of the patent application, patent invalidity, or un-
enforceability of granted patents. 
The second reason to introduce the requirement is that it will reverse 
a rising protectionist trend which threatens the sustainability of research 
that relies on TK. This is a trend in which source communities are increas-
ing restrictions on access to TK resources.41 A requirement to disclose the 
source of TK used in an inventive process will play a key role in tracking 
use and enforcing obligations that inventors may have in the laws of source 
countries or in contracts with source countries. A requirement that enables 
source communities to have some power to enforce access and bene-
fit-sharing conditions would undo this protectionist trend and create a 
more collaborative and efficient relationship between researchers and 
source communities. This, in turn, is expected to create and sustain a prom-
ising relationship in relevant industries and improve resource conserva-
tion. At a higher level of generalization, requiring disclosure is a way of 
establishing a more inclusive system of recognition and reward for inno-
vation. Instead of rewarding the inventor at the end of the inventive pro-
cess,42 a different framework would seek to reward those that provide use-
ful contribution earlier in that process. 
Amending the U.S. Patent Act to explicitly introduce the requirement 
may be the most effective mechanism considering the twin goals of re-
versing a rising protectionist trend and compelling socially beneficial in-
formation from patent applicants. However, amending U.S. patent law 
may be infeasible given the lack of political interest to introduce such an 
amendment and the considerable opposition that may be expected from 
industry. Therefore, clarifying the duties of disclosure, candor, and good 
  
 37. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory 
of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 94 (1989). 
 38. The source of a TK is the entity through which the patent applicant received access while 
the origin is the source community that was first to develop the resource. The source of a TK could be 
an intermediary such as a gene bank or an archive that is unrelated to the source community. 
 39. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 37, at 92. 
 40. Id. at 123–24. 
 41. Charles McManis, Biodiversity, Biotechnology and Traditional Knowledge Protection: 
Law, Science and Practice, in BIODIVERSITY AND THE LAW: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, 
BIOTECHNOLOGY AND TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE 5, 5–7 (Charles McManis ed., 2007). 
 42. JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF 
THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 125–26 (1997) (criticizing the focus of IP laws for limiting recognition 
and reward for innovative activity to individuals making transformative contributions). 
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faith43 that patent applications already have by explicitly introducing the 
requirement would be a feasible second-best measure. The Article also ar-
gues that the PTO, as the most suitable administrative agency for patent 
examination, should check for compliance with the requirement as well.  
Part I introduces the U.S. patent system and the disclosure require-
ment under current law. It discusses existing disclosure problems created 
by the information asymmetry between patent applicants and examiners. 
The Part concludes by highlighting that the information asymmetry is even 
more pronounced in applications that rely on TK. Part II outlines the value 
of TK resources for modern industries and the dramatic rate at which they 
are disappearing. The Part also posits that there is a troubling and ineffi-
cient protectionist trend in which source communities are increasingly re-
stricting access to their TK. Part III proposes to solve the disclosure prob-
lem in the context of TK use by amending U.S. patent law to include a 
requirement that patent applicants disclose the source of TK they use in 
their research. Part III makes the normative case for conceiving the re-
quirement as an information-forcing rule. It explains how conceiving the 
requirement this way could provide important guidance on what features 
an effective requirement should include. The Part also points out that a 
carefully designed disclosure requirement has the potential to reverse the 
rising protectionist trend. Lastly, Part IV discusses the institutional mech-
anisms through which the requirement should be formulated in U.S. law. 
I. PATENTS, INCENTIVES, AND DISCLOSURE  
Think of a researcher who is about to decide whether to invest in re-
search and development of a new product. If the idea behind the product 
can be copied, the researcher may face the risk that others may use it to 
produce the product and compete in the market against the researcher.44 If 
the competition is high enough, the researcher may not recoup the cost of 
research and development, which may force the researcher to decide 
against investing in the project in the first place.45 One option the re-
searcher has is to keep the information secret and use the information to 
produce products.46 The Coca-Cola Company has been able to produce 
and sell its products while keeping the formula secret for well over a cen-
tury.47  
  
 43. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2018); see also 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2018). 
 44. See generally Yoram Barzel, Optimal Timing of Innovations, 50 REV. ECON. & STAT. 348 
(1968) (outlining an economic examination of the incentives involved in investing in innovation). 
 45. For a detailed discussion of the reasoning behind the monopolistic patent rights, see gener-
ally WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, INVENTION, GROWTH, AND WELFARE: A THEORETICAL TREATMENT OF 
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 70–90 (1969). 
 46. See generally James Bessen, Patents and the Diffusion of Technical Information, 86 ECON. 
LETTERS 121 (2005) (developing an economic model comparing patent rights and trade secrecy as 
options for innovation and finding that patent right do not necessarily do a better job). 
 47. Steven N. S. Cheung, Property Rights in Trade Secrets, 20 ECON. INQUIRY 40, 40–53 
(1982). 
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However, the option of relying on secrecy has some limitations.48 For 
one, the product must be of a kind that cannot be reverse engineered by 
others because, if it is, then others could just buy a product, reverse engi-
neer it,49 and discover the secret information. More importantly, for inno-
vation policy purposes, researchers keeping the results of their research 
secret limits the potential for innovation. The sharing of information 
among researchers spurs innovation by enabling researchers to learn and 
be inspired by information they receive from one another.50  
Patent law is designed to address the disincentive to invest in ideas 
that may be copied and the incentive to keep new information secret. Pa-
tent rights allow the patentee to practice an invention exclusively and en-
able her to recoup the costs of developing an idea that could have been 
copied by others. From the perspective of innovation policy, patents are 
desirable because they encourage researchers to invest in developing ideas 
that would otherwise not be developed, and they encourage those with use-
ful information to disclose it to the public, thereby facilitating innova-
tion.51 
This utilitarian perspective is the standard justification for patent 
rights in the United States,52 where rights are granted to “encourage the 
progress of . . . useful arts.”53 The expectation is that inventors will invest 
resources to develop inventions in anticipation of the reward of an exclu-
sive right to exclude others from using the invention. In economic par-
lance, the problem patent law seeks to solve is one of the nonexcludable 
nature of inventions. Patent law allows inventors to internalize the benefits 
of their research.54  
Policy makers have implemented limitations to balance the incentive 
that patents grant to inventors with the interest of the public. One of the 
key limitations is the term limit on patent rights, which is a constitutionally 
  
 48. See Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights, 61 
STAN. L. REV. 311, 311–13 (2008). 
 49. David D. Friedman, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Some Economics of Trade 
Secret Law, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 1991, at 61, 62. 
 50. Hsiu-Fen Lin, Knowledge Sharing and Firm Innovation Capability: An Empirical Study, 
28 INT’L J. MANPOWER 315, 315–32 (2007). 
 51. The view of patents as an anti-secrecy tool has been studied by patent law scholars for 
decades. See, e.g., Anthony Arundel, The Relative Effectiveness of Patents and Secrecy for Appropri-
ation, 30 RES. POL’Y 611, 611–24 (2001). 
 52. This standard justification has been challenged by scholars who suggest other competing 
justifications for the granting of patent rights. See, e.g., Edwin C. Hettinger, Justifying Intellectual 
Property, 18 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 31, 31–32 (1989); Alfred E. Kahn, Fundamental Deficiencies of the 
American Patent Law, 30 AM. ECON. REV. 475, 475 (1940); Fritz Machlup & Edith Penrose, The 
Patent Controversy in the Nineteenth Century, 10 J. ECON. HIST. 1, 1–2 (1950). 
 53. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 54. WILLIAM LANDES & RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW 294 (2003). 
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mandated feature of patent laws.55 The most common type of patent rights, 
utility patents, last twenty years after the date of application. This limita-
tion allows the public to freely use the information disclosed in the patent 
application after the expiration of the exclusive patent right. Even while 
the patent has not expired, the public is free to “invent around” it—to use 
the information in the patent application to develop similar solutions with-
out infringing the right. Furthermore, patent rights are granted to inven-
tions that meet certain substantive and formal requirements.  
There are three core requirements of patentability: novelty (newness), 
nonobviousness, and usefulness (utility).56 Inventions must meet all three 
of these requirements to be eligible for patentability. To be considered 
novel, the claimed invention must be different from anything disclosed to 
the public through a publication, in another patent application, in products 
or services sold on the market, or in other ways.57 An invention will be 
nonobvious if it involves such a high level of inventive step that a person 
with the average knowledge and skill in that field would be unable to 
recreate it easily.58 To meet the usefulness requirement, an invention must 
be “minimally operable towards some practical purpose.”59 
In addition to these statutory requirements, courts have excluded cer-
tain types of information from patentability—the three interrelated ex-
cluded subject matters are “laws of nature, physical phenomena, and ab-
stract ideas.”60 The excluded subject matters are meant to reserve the basic 
building blocks of research and natural processes from becoming the pri-
vate property of a patent applicant.61 Therefore, to get a patent right over 
a naturally occurring substance, applicants have to show that they have 
created something new using that substance. A common example is the 
development of synthetic versions of naturally occuring compounds. In-
novative applications of abstract ideas, laws of nature, and physical phe-
nomena may be patentable if they meet other patentability requirements.62  
Furthermore, the application must disclose the invention and the 
manner of making and using it.63 The requirement to disclose information 
about the claimed invention is a key part of patent law, and it is stated in 
  
 55. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The Constitution grants Congress the power “To promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the ex-
clusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” Id. (emphasis added). 
 56. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103 (2018). 
 57. 35 U.S.C. § 102. 
 58. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). 
 59. FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION 
AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 3 (2003). 
 60. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216–17 (2014) (citing Ass’n for 
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 589 (2013)). Courts have used these 
three phrases loosely and, at times, interchangeably. 
 61. Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 216; Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs, Inc., 566 U.S. 
70, 71 (2012). 
 62. Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 216–17 (citing Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). 
 63. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2018). 
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many forms. This principle is especially important for the discussions in 
this Article, and thus the following Section provides a detailed discussion 
of the content and scope of the duty to disclose under U.S. patent law.  
A. The Duty of Disclosure  
The core disclosure requirement in U.S. patent law is outlined under 
35 U.S.C. § 112(a) of the Patent Act.64 It states that patent applications 
“shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and 
process of making and using it, in . . . full, clear, concise, and exact 
terms.”65 In addition to describing the invention and the surrounding prior 
art in detail, the patent application is required to list references that situate 
the claimed invention. These references usually include other patents, 
printed publications, and other sources that hold information relevant for 
the examination of the patent application.  
The requirement in 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) is supplemented by the duty 
of disclosure, candor, and good faith that is codified in 37 C.F.R. § 1.56, 
which is colloquially called “Rule 56.”66 Under this duty, patent applicants 
must disclose any information that is deemed to be material for patentabil-
ity. Information is deemed to be “material” if it “establishes, by itself or in 
combination with other information, a prima facie case of unpatentability 
of a claim” or if it “refutes, or is inconsistent with, a position the applicant 
takes.”67 Although this definition seems to significantly limit the scope of 
the information required to be disclosed, the duty to disclose has a very 
broad interpretation. In clarifying the rule further, the relevant provision 
states that a prima facie case of unpatentability exists if an examiner would 
find a single claim in the application unpatentable giving the claim “its 
broadest reasonable construction . . . and before any consideration is given 
to evidence” which may rebut this finding.68 The rule establishes a very 
broad understanding of what amounts to material information.  
What makes Rule 56 even broader is its reference to the duty of 
candor and good faith. The PTO has explained, through its Manual of Pa-
tent Examining Procedure (MPEP), that the duties of candor and good 
faith are broader than the duty to disclose material information.69 Further-
more, as the Federal Circuit explained in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. 
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc.,70 “Materiality is not limited to prior art but 
embraces any information that a reasonable examiner would be substan-
  
 64. Id. § 112(a). 
 65. Id. 
 66. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2018). 
 67. Id. § 1.56(b)(1)–(2). 
 68. Id. § 1.56(b)(3). 
 69. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINATION PROCEDURE 
§ 2001.04 (2018) [hereinafter MPEP], https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/mpep-2000.pdf. 
 70. 326 F.3d 1226 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
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tially likely to consider important in deciding whether to allow an applica-
tion to issue as a patent.”71 Additionally, this expanded duty exists no mat-
ter how the patent applicant came across the information.72 The applicant, 
for example, cannot engage in willful ignorance and avoid accessing ex-
plicit notice of material information.73  
Parallel to statutory law, courts have used their power in equity to 
develop an independent and, at times, different duty than the one devel-
oped under the Patent Act and the PTO rules.74 The Supreme Court in Pre-
cision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Co.75 held that a patent would be 
unenforceable if the patentee has “unclean hands.”76 The Court held that 
there is a strong “public policy against the assertion and enforcement of 
patent claims infected with fraud and perjury.”77 Although the unclean-
hands doctrine was narrow when it was initially developed, courts have 
expanded the doctrine to apply to a wide range of cases in which the patent 
applicant was not upfront in her correspondence with the PTO.78 In a key 
decision expanding the doctrine, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals 
stated that the unclean hands doctrine “cannot be applied too narrowly if 
the relationship . . . between applicants and the Patent Office is to have 
any real meaning.”79 Under this expanded duty, currently called inequita-
ble conduct, a patent could be unenforceable if an applicant withholds in-
formation the courts deem relevant.80 The Federal Circuit in Hycor Corp. 
v. Schlueter Co.81 declared that “the highest standards of honesty and can-
dor on the part of applicants in presenting such facts to the office are thus 
necessary elements in a working patent system. We would go so far as to 
say they are essential.”82 As the above discussions reveal, Rule 56, the case 
law, and the PTO manual repeatedly emphasize that patent applicants have 
the highest level of duty of disclosure, candor, and good faith. 
The function of the disclosure requirement could be grouped into 
two: a teaching function and a limiting function.83 The teaching function 
speaks to the value of disclosure in revealing useful information about the 
state of the art to the public. As the Supreme Court declared in Kewanee 
  
 71. Id. at 1234. 
 72. MPEP, supra note 69, § 2001.06. 
 73. Brasseler, U.S.A. I, L.P. v. Stryker Sales Corp., 267 F.3d 1370, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (dis-
cussing that if an applicant or the attorney knows that there is relevant information, they cannot ignore 
such notice to avoid the duty to disclose). 
 74. ROBERT P. MERGES & JOHN F. DUFFY, PATENT LAW & POLICY 1104 (4th ed. 2007). 
 75. 324 U.S. 806 (1945). 
 76. Id. at 819. 
 77. Id. 
 78. MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 74. 
 79. Norton v. Curtiss, 433 F.2d 779, 795 (C.C.P.A. 1970). 
 80. MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 74. The inequitable conduct doctrine is not without criticism. 
See generally Nolan-Stevaux, supra note 33, at 161–62 (arguing that the inequitable conduct doctrine 
has been abused by defendants because it is used in almost all patent infringement lawsuits). 
 81. 740 F.2d 1529 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
 82. Id. at 1538 (quoting Norton, 433 F.2d at 794). 
 83. Rantanen, supra note 34, at 375. 
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Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.,84 the disclosure is meant to add to the public’s 
“general store of knowledge.”85 In its limiting function, disclosure works 
to limit the scope of the claim in the patent application (the metes and 
bounds of the right granted to the inventor). Because patents are only 
granted to new inventions, the applicant cannot claim rights over infor-
mation disclosed to the public before the patent application. 
B. Disclosure Problems in Current Law 
Despite the heightened level of the disclosure requirement in U.S. 
patent law, research86 has shown that patent applicants withhold infor-
mation from the PTO and, as a result, receive a right where one is not 
deserved or receive a broader right than the invention they developed. This 
dynamic is created because of the inherent information asymmetry be-
tween the patent applicant and the examiner.87 The inventor who applies 
for an invention would usually have dedicated a considerable amount of 
time researching in the field to develop a new, nonobvious, and useful in-
vention. Furthermore, patent applicants use vague wording and other 
claim-drafting techniques to introduce confusion about the scope of the 
claimed invention that they could later exploit to their advantage.88 This 
information asymmetry and the ex parte nature of patent prosecution pro-
vides both the motive and the opportunity for patent applicants to withhold 
important information from the examiner. This issue has been highlighted 
by many patent law scholars89 and is examined in further detail in a later 
Section.90  
II. PROBLEMS IN THE CONTEXT OF TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE  
The problems of withholding important information from patent ex-
aminers is exacerbated in inventions that rely on TK resources. This is 
because the inherent information asymmetry in the patent system is even 
more stark in the case of TK use. One of the common features of TK re-
sources is that they are inaccessible. In contrast to the emphasis on docu-
menting knowledge in Western societies, indigenous peoples and local 
  
 84. 416 U.S. 470 (1974). 
 85. Id. at 481. 
 86. See Christopher A. Cotropia & Mark A. Lemley, Copying in Patent Law, 87 N.C. L. REV. 
1421, 1465 (2009); Fromer, supra note 25, at 560–62; Lemley, supra note 30, at 1499–1500; John M. 
Olin, The Disclosure Function of the Patent System (or Lack Thereof), 118 HARV. L. REV. 2007, 2024 
(2005); Dan Callaway, Note, Patent Incentives in the Semiconductor Industry, 4 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 
135, 143–44 (2008). 
 87. See generally Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Pierson, Peer Review, and Patent Law, 69 VAND. 
L. REV. 1825, 1828 (2016). 
 88. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 1155, 1163–64 (2002); Ben Klemens, The Rise of the Information Processing Patent, 14 
B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 1, 35 (2008) (finding that software and IT related patents are “virtually useless 
for disclosure purposes”); Henry E. Smith, Institutions and Indirectness in Intellectual Property, 157 
U. PA. L. REV. 2083, 2127–28 (2009). 
 89. Cotropia & Lemley, supra note 86, at 1499–1500; Wagner, supra note 29. 
 90. See infra Section III.A.1 on information-forcing rules in patent law. 
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communities predominantly use oral traditions to conserve and transfer 
knowledge.91 In the rare cases where TK resources are codified, they tend 
to be codified in local languages that may not be understood by patent 
examiners. Therefore, the unique features of TK that make it inaccessible 
increase the information asymmetry between an inventor who managed to 
gain access to TK and a patent examiner working to decide the patentabil-
ity of the claimed invention. The following Sections outline the issues that 
arise and problems that must be addressed when modern industries rely on 
TK resources in their inventive process.  
A. The Value & Loss of TK Resources92 
The relationship between the requirement and the use of TK re-
sources can be explained through the example of modern drug discovery 
and development. Although the example of TK use in the biopharmaceu-
tical field is used as an example throughout this Article, one can imagine 
the multiple areas of modern research and development that could benefit 
from the use of TK.93  
It is no secret that research and development takes considerable time 
and resources in the biotechnology and pharmaceutical (hereafter biophar-
maceutical) industries. For instance, by one estimate, the out-of-pocket 
preapproval cost of the development of a drug to the point of marketing is 
around $802 million.94 And the average time from human testing to 
post-regulatory approval is estimated to be over nine years.95 One ap-
proach that biopharmaceutical firms have adopted to reduce this cost is 
“ethnopharmacology” or “ethnomedicine,” which is the use of TK in the 
  
 91. Gebru, supra note 22, at 300. 
 92. TK resources may be useful in two ways. The resources are used by indigenous peoples and 
local communities as they have been used for centuries, for example for traditional healthcare, agri-
cultural management, and environmental conservation. Another way TK resources are useful is as an 
input in modern industries. This Section focuses on this second type of use because of its relevance 
for the requirement. This, however, is not meant to discount the independent use of that TK resources 
have for the source community. The independent use of TK resources has been essential for the sur-
vival of indigenous peoples and local communities. For instance, the World Health Organization has 
stated that 70–80% of the population in developing countries relies on the independent use of tradi-
tional medicine and substantial portions of the population in developed countries rely on some form 
of alternative medicine. See Xiaorui Zhang, Traditional Medicine: Its Importance and Protection, in 
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 95. KI Kaitin, Deconstructing the Drug Development Process: The New Face of Innovation, 87 
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search of resources with medicinal value.96 Empirical research has proved 
that ethnopharmacology has reduced the time and cost of developing bio-
pharmaceutical products.97 One of the key benefits of using TK resources 
is in increasing the efficiency of initial screening of biodiversity candi-
dates for further examination. For instance, in one study, the chances of 
getting a preliminary hit98 in plant screening increased from 6% without 
the use of TK to 25% with the use of TK.99 Additional research indicated 
that the use of TK increased the efficiency of screening plants in the de-
velopment of a cure for HIV/AIDS.100 While some claims of traditional 
medicines have had questionable efficacy,101 the empirical evidence points 
to the significant potential that TK resources have as an input for modern 
industries. The trial and error from the centuries-old use of biodiversity 
resources by communities has been serving as a diverse pool upon which 
biopharmaceutical firms build to develop modern drugs. 
Despite the value of biodiversity and TK resources, they increasingly 
face an alarming rate of loss.102 Conservationists have been warning of the 
high rate of biodiversity loss since the later decades of the twentieth cen-
tury.103 Caused by human activity such as changes in land use, pollution, 
  
 96. See generally Gordon C. Rausser & Arthur A. Small, Valuing Research Leads: Bio-
prospecting and the Conservation of Genetic Resources, 108 J. POL. ECON. 173, 178 (2000) (“Indeed, 
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4 CURRENT TOPICS IN MED. CHEMISTRY 569, 580 (2004); Benoit Deprez & Rebecca Deprez-Poulain, 
Hit-to-Lead: Driving Forces for the Medicinal Chemist, 4 CURRENT TOPICS IN MED. CHEMISTRY I, at 
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Medicine in Bioprospecting, 109 PNAS 15835, 15835 (2012). 
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climate change, and invasion of invasive species, the loss of biodiversity 
has been estimated to be 100–1000 times the rate it would be without hu-
man interference.104 For example, the normal rate of biodiversity loss used 
to be in the range of “1–10 species per million per year,” but in recent 
years that number has risen to “hundreds or low thousands per million per 
year.”105 Researchers have calculated the annual loss from ecosystem ser-
vices to be around $250 billion.106 To save this valuable resource from 
disappearing, world leaders worked towards the signing of the Convention 
on Biological Diversity in 1992.107 Two of the key contributions of the 
Convention to our current purposes were: (1) the recognition that source 
countries have sovereign rights in their biodiversity resources;108 and (2) 
the recognition that indigenous peoples and local communities should eq-
uitably benefit from the innovations arising out of TK resources.109  
In addition to the inherent harm caused by the loss of biodiversity, 
this alarming rate of loss impacts the sustainability of innovation in the 
bioprospecting industry. Because only a small portion of the world’s bio-
diversity has been scientifically studied,110 the high rate of loss means in-
ventors (and by implication, the public) miss out on the development of 
products with potential to enhance welfare.  
B. A Rising Protectionist Trend 
One of the key contributions of this Article is to highight a rising 
protectionist trend that should worry anyone interested in encouraging 
innovation in industries that rely on TK resources. The protectionist trend 
is one in which source communities and countries rich in TK resources are 
increasingly introducing barriers to access to these resources. While the 
tendency to keep TK secret because of fears of biopiracy have been men-
tioned in other publications,111 these references tend to be made only in 
  
 104. See V. H. HEYWOOD, UNITED NATIONS ENV’T PROGRAMME, GLOBAL BIODIVERSITY 
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passing. This Article makes the case that there is a strong and rising pro-
tectionist trend among source communities that policy makers should se-
riously consider. 
Biodiversity resources are unevenly distributed throughout the world. 
Countries in the Global South112 are home to a high percentage of biodi-
versity resources. For instance, megadiverse countries113—the top seven-
teen biodiversity-rich countries in the world—hold between 60–80% of 
the world’s flora and fauna.114 Only two of the seventeen megadiverse 
countries—the United States and Australia—are economically developed 
countries. On the other hand, the capacity to exploit these resources on a 
commercial scale is concentrated in the Global North. This uneven distri-
bution of resources, coupled with the lack of legal protection for TK re-
sources and the absence of research and business practices that recognize 
the contribution of source communities, create what many consider to be 
an unfair relationship. This is one of the major concerns that led to the 
convening, and later signature, of the Convention on Biological Diver-
sity.115 
While the signing of the Convention was a major milestone to con-
serve biodiversity and ensure benefit sharing, the implementation of the 
Convention was far from what source communities and countries hoped 
for. This legal lacuna and many high-profile cases of biopiracy116 have 
forced many source communities and jurisdictions to create barriers to ac-
cess to TK resources. While the Convention’s mission was to facilitate 
access to TK resources in exchange for benefit sharing, its failure seems 
to have encouraged quite the opposite. As one scholar noted: 
[T]he [Convention on Biodiversity] has . . . stimulated a wave of na-
tional legislation having the effect (whether intended or unintended) 
of restricting, rather than facilitating, access to genetic resources in the 
developing world, pending the industrialized world’s adoption of a 
meaningful benefit-sharing measures.117 
  
 112. The term “Global South” is a rough reference to developing countries which are concen-
trated south of the equator. Nour Dados & Raewyn Connell, The Global South, CONTEXTS, Winter 
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The Convention was signed because member countries understood 
that access to biodiversity resources was necessary for innovation in cer-
tain fields. Thus, evidence of a rising protectionist trend should worry pol-
icy makers tasked with encouraging the “[p]rogress of . . . useful arts.”118  
The rise in protectionist trend can be observed in at least two features 
of domestic legal activity. The first is the increasing number of new legis-
lation creating barriers to access to TK, or the amendment of existing leg-
islation (including intellectual property (IP)119 laws) to include TK protec-
tion.120 Several of the major biodiversity hotspots of the world have en-
acted domestic legislation with the effect of restricting access to TK.121 
For instance, in June 2018, the second biggest megadiverse country, Indo-
nesia, strengthened its laws to protect its biodiversity from biopirates.122 
While legislation governing TK resources may be crafted to facilitate ac-
cess, because most are reacting to allegations of biopiracy, they do not 
seem to meet the right balance between access and restriction. 
The second feature that signals a rising protectionist trend is the cre-
ation of restricted TK databases or registers. While the practice of docu-
menting TK in databases is still new, many of the jurisdictions that have 
decided to invest in these databases seem to have adopted highly restric-
tive measures. For instance, the pioneering TK database is the Indian gov-
ernment’s Traditional Knowledge Digital Library (TKDL), which boasts 
the codification of over 250,000 medical formulations from Indian tradi-
tional medicinal knowledge.123 While those who manage the TKDL claim 
the database is accessible due to the translation of its contents into five of 
the leading international languages, access to the database is granted only 
to patent examiners for the sole purpose of patent examination.124 Patent 
  
 118. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 119. The term “intellectual property” is generally used to refer to the rights granted over scien-
tific, literary, and artistic creations that meet a set of requirements under the law. The three core types 
of intellectual property rights are patents, copyrights, and trademarks. See What Is Intellectual Prop-
erty?, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., https://www.wipo.int/about-ip/en (last visited Mar. 22, 2019). 
 120. A search for TK-related legislation on the WIPO legal text database results in 173 records. 
Almost all of these legislations were enacted after the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), and 
the overwhelming majority are among countries of the Global South. Some of these legislations cover 
several issues including TK, traditional cultural expression, and genetic resources. WIPO LEX 
SEARCH, https://wipolex.wipo.int/en/legislation/results?subjectMatters=18 (last visited Mar. 22, 
2019). 
 121. Carvalho, supra note 111, at 245–46; Thomas Cottier & Marion Panizzon, Legal Perspec-
tives on Traditional Knowledge: The Case for Intellectual Property Protection, in INTERNATIONAL 
PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
REGIME 565, 565–94 (Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman eds., 2005) (outlining national legis-
lations enacted to protect TK in India, Brazil, Peru, the Philippines, and the Africa model legislation). 
 122. Harish Mehta, Indonesia Strengthens Laws Against Biopirates, BUS. TIMES (June 8, 2018, 
5:50 AM), https://www.businesstimes.com.sg/opinion/indonesia-strengthens-laws-against-biopirates. 
 123. See About TKDL, TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE DIGITAL LIBR., 
http://www.tkdl.res.in/tkdl/langdefault/common/Abouttkdl.asp?GL=Eng (last visited Mar. 22, 2019). 
 124. By granting access to several patent offices around the world, including the PTO, the TKDL 
has already been credited for the revocation, suspension, or amendment of 206 patents in multiple 
jurisdictions. Additionally, the Indian government has submitted challenges against over 1,200 patent 
applications. See id. 
 
554 DENVER LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96:3 
offices interested in gaining access to the database have to sign a nondis-
closure agreement after negotiating the specific terms with the Indian gov-
ernment.125 Other countries are adopting this practice of making TK data-
bases restrictive.126  
Policy makers should be concerned that, instead of increased access 
that spurs improvements, researchers now face restrictions. Because the 
ultimate result of a research project is usually unpredictable, researchers 
need access to a wide range of input, including TK. If states with huge 
biodiversity resources continue adopting a restrictive stance, it is easy to 
imagine how such a trend could affect research in industries that benefit 
from TK, including the biopharmaceutical sector. Even if researchers find 
a way around restrictions, legislation, and TK registries, the increase in 
transaction costs of accessing these resources creates inefficiencies.  
The move towards protectionism is even more troubling because 
most source communities do not have the capacity to independently de-
velop TK into modern products. For instance, if source communities could 
develop their traditional medicinal knowledge into a drug that could be 
marketed globally, then the restrictions would function in the same way 
trade secrets help firms develop products while keeping commercially val-
uable information hidden.127 However, the overwhelming majority of 
source communities and many megadiverse countries lack the financial 
and human resource capacity to develop TK resources into commercial 
products. Furthermore, there are multiple reports sounding the alarm on 
the very high rate of biodiversity loss,128 and TK resources rely heavily on 
biodiversity. Protectionism, in the face of such a high rate of resource loss, 
  
 125. See Traditional Knowledge Digital Library (TKDL) Access Agreement, TRADITIONAL 
KNOWLEDGE DIGITAL LIBR., http://www.tkdl.res.in/tkdl/langdefault/common/terms.pdf (last visited 
Mar. 22, 2019). 
 126. REPUBLIC OF S. AFR. DEP’T OF SCIENCE & TECH., THE NATIONAL RECORDAL SYSTEM: 
PRESENTED TO THE NATIONAL BIODIVERSITY INITIATIVE 8, 17 (2013), http://www.abs-initia-
tive.info/uploads/media/Carol_van_Wyk___Tom_Suchanandan_-_DST_-
_National_Recordal_System.pdf; Bandile Sikwane, National Recordal System: Safeguarding the Fu-
ture of Indigenous Knowledge Through ICT, CSIR SCI. SCOPE 60, 60–61 (2015); Korean Intellectual 
Property Office, Introduction of Korean Traditional Knowledge Portal (KTKP), WORLD INTELL. 
PROP. ORG. (2011), 
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Mar. 22, 2019); Song Jiangxiu, State Intellectual Prop. Office of the People’s Republic of China, In-
troduction of China Traditional Chinese Medicine Patent Database, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG. 
(Dec. 16–17, 2009), 
https://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/tk/en/wipo_iptk_bkk_09/wipo_iptk_bkk_09_topic5_2.pdf. 
 127. Doris Estelle Long, Trade Secrets and Traditional Knowledge: Strengthening International 
Protection of Indigenous Innovation, in THE LAW AND THEORY OF TRADE SECRECY: A HANDBOOK 
OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 495, 536 (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Katherine J. Strandburg eds., 2011) 
(suggesting the extension of trade secrecy protection for TK ). 
 128. See generally BIODIVERSITY LOSS: ECONOMIC AND ECOLOGICAL ISSUES (Charles Perrings 
et al. eds., 1997); Ben A. Minteer, Valuing Nature, in LOSS OF BIODIVERSITY 75, 86 (Sharon L. Spray 
& Karen L. McGlothlin eds., 2003); THE ROOT CAUSES OF BIODIVERSITY LOSS 9 (Alexander Wood 
et al. eds., 2000); Stuart L. Pimm et al., The Future of Biodiversity, 269 SCIENCE 347, 347–50 (1995); 
John G. Robinson, The Limits to Caring: Sustainable Living and the Loss of Biodiversity, 7 
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 20, 25 (1993). 
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will result in numerous TK resources disappearing for eternity before be-
ing examined for their bioprospecting potential. In other words, a protec-
tionist stance, coupled with the lack of capacity in source communities to 
independently commercialize TK, results in the underutilization of this 
valuable resource.129 This is undesirable from the perspective of global so-
cial welfare because increased access to research input is expected to en-
courage innovation, not increased restrictions.130  
Ultimately, a rising protectionist trend means that the status quo in 
which firms use TK resources to develop products is unsustainable in the 
long run. Because of this protectionist trend, researchers and firms that 
have the means to commercialize TK resources will be unable to access 
the resources (or may face high transaction costs), and their bioprospecting 
effort will be curtailed. The unfortunate results will be that the public will 
miss out on innovative products, firms in the field will see the costs of 
doing research rise because of high transaction costs, and source commu-
nities will miss out on a share of the profits that they would have received 
had their TK resources been used to develop products. The increasing 
number of restrictions created by several jurisdictions show that this wor-
risome protectionist trend is on the rise. 
III. ADDRESSING DISCLOSURE IN THE TK CONTEXT  
A major contribution of the Article is using a welfareist perspective 
to justify introducing the requirement in U.S. patent law. The requirement 
would lead to welfare-enhancing outcomes instead of the inefficient and 
unsustainable status quo where researchers face a rising protectionist trend 
or where the PTO grants patent rights to undeserving applicants. Amend-
ing U.S. law to introduce the requirement is justified based on the twin 
goals of improving patent quality and reversing a rising protectionist trend.  
While some version of the requirement has been discussed interna-
tionally,131 a robust discussion of the costs and benefits of introducing the 
requirement in domestic U.S. law is lacking. The next two Sections turn 
to the normative case for explicitly introducing the requirement into U.S. 
  
 129. DARRELL A. POSEY & GRAHAM DUTFIELD, BEYOND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: TOWARD 
TRADITIONAL RESOURCE RIGHTS FOR INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND LOCAL COMMUNITIES 1–2 (1996). 
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WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 111, 184 (2005). 
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patent law. The stated goal of the U.S. patent system is to encourage “the 
progress of . . . useful arts.”132 The rest of the Article argues that the intro-
duction of a carefully calibrated and explicit requirement to disclose the 
source of TK used in inventive processes would be consistent with this 
goal. 
A. Information-Forcing Rules  
This Section makes the normative case for the introduction of an ex-
plicit requirement that would compel patent applicants to disclose the 
source of TK they used in their application. It also outlines the value of 
conceiving the requirement as an information-forcing rule. The require-
ment should be designed as an information-forcing rule that can elicit so-
cially beneficial information from the least-cost providers (i.e., patent ap-
plicants). Conceiving the requirement in this way reveals that it will im-
prove patent quality and reduce costs in the patent system without unduly 
burdening researchers. This Article posits that the cost-benefit analysis of 
introducing the requirement should be reconsidered through the lens of an 
information-forcing rule.  
While information-forcing rules have been examined in many con-
texts, the first strong case for the adoption of such rules was made in the 
contracts context.133 In their seminal article discussing information-forc-
ing rules,134 Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner identify two types of scenarios 
in the context of contracts that would benefit from the adoption of default-
penalty rules. One scenario is in which parties facing significant transac-
tion cost ex ante create contractual gaps with the intention of having the 
gaps filled with an ex post court interpretation based on the standard of 
“what the parties would have wanted.”135 The parties avoid adding a con-
tractual term because the ex ante cost is higher than the ex post cost of 
having a court interpret the contract. The cost of interpreting the contrac-
tual term is, therefore, an externality born by publicly supported courts.  
The second type of scenario that Ayres and Gertner identify is one in 
which a party with private information creates a contractual gap by with-
holding privately held information that, if revealed, would result in a so-
cially optimal outcome.136 The well-informed party withholds the infor-
mation because, even if the disclosure of information would increase the 
pie, the party’s portion of the pie will be smaller than if the party kept the 
information private. In this second scenario, default rules can be designed 
to force the well-informed party to reveal the privately held information 
and thereby enable a socially beneficial deal to take place. In a sense, the 
  
 132. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 133. Alex Reinert, Pleading as Information-Forcing, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 3, 2012, 
at 1, 3.  
 134. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 37, at 91. 
 135. Id. at 92–93. 
 136. Id. at 94. 
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default rules function against a strategic, rent-seeking behavior that a 
well-informed party may take in a contract negotiation.  
This second type of relationship may be observed in the employment 
contract sense. While the default employment contract in the United States 
is “at will,” most employees erroneously believe that they cannot be fired 
from their jobs without “just cause.”137 Sophisticated employers who usu-
ally draft a boilerplate employment contract can be expected to know the 
“at will” nature of their employment relationship with their employees. By 
concealing the “at will” nature of an employment contract, an employer 
may benefit from the false sense of job security that its employee may 
have, while being able to terminate any individual without cause. Courts 
and legislators can (and do in some circumstances) adopt a default rule 
that the employment contract will be presumed to be a “just cause” em-
ployment unless the employer explicitly communicates the “at will” nature 
of employment to their potential employees. Adopting such a default rule 
will ensure that the well-informed party (the employer) discloses the pri-
vately held information (the “at will” nature of employment) to the em-
ployee, thereby ensuring a real meeting of the minds when the parties enter 
into an employment contract. The adoption of information-forcing default 
rules in these contexts, therefore, serves the core purpose of contract law: 
ensuring that there is a meeting of the minds between parties to the con-
tract.  
Several other doctrines of contract law could be described as infor-
mation-forcing (or information-eliciting) default rules. The rule that vague 
terms in contracts will be construed against the drafting party,138 and the 
presumption, in the Statute of Frauds, that parties do not intend to have a 
legally enforceable agreement unless it is made in writing, can be 
understood as a default-penalty rule.139 Information-forcing rules have 
been identified in other areas of law including constitutional law, employ-
ment law, legal ethics, the law of corporations, environmental law, arbi-
tration, and criminal law.140  
  
 137. J. H. Verkerke, Legal Ignorance and Information-Forcing Rules, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
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 138. David M. Driesen & Shubha Gosh, The Functions of Transaction Costs: Rethinking Trans-
action Cost Minimization in a World of Friction, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 61, 72 (2005). 
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1. Information-Forcing Rules in Patent Law 
IP law scholars have embraced the information-forcing rule’s litera-
ture as a helpful lens to examine various doctrines.141 This is even more so 
the case in the patent law field.142 The predominance of a utilitarian justi-
fication for patent law lends itself to an incentive-based analysis. More 
importantly, the various doctrines in patent law seem to have been de-
signed to force patent applicants to disclose as much information as pos-
sible. The information-forcing default rules literature is especially well 
placed as a useful analytic tool in patent law because of the unique dynam-
ics involved between the different “parties”—patent applicants, patent ex-
aminers, courts, competitors, and the public. Patent applicants (inventors) 
are usually the leading experts in the particular field of scientific inquiry 
to which their invention belongs and, as a result, they tend to have the most 
relevant information about their invention. Although patent examiners 
have a scientific background, they cannot be expected to have expert 
knowledge of every invention they examine. Furthermore, patent appli-
cants have the incentive to withhold information from patent examiners, 
their competitors, and the public. Disclosing relevant information about 
prior art may limit the scope of their patent claims, and the more infor-
mation inventors reveal about their invention, the more they may be giving 
up their competitive advantage. The fact that patent claims are drafted by 
patent applicants and that the scope of the exclusive patent right is based 
on the amount of information disclosed gives patent applicants “the motive 
and the opportunity” to withhold information from the patent examiner.143  
More importantly, for our current context, the various rules compel-
ling patent applicants to disclose information about the claimed invention 
have information-forcing qualities.144 The relationship in patent law is 
generally described as a “social contract” between the inventor and the 
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 143. Wagner, supra note 29, at 215. 
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public. The inventor shares useful information about a new and nonobvi-
ous invention—information that could otherwise be kept a secret145—in 
exchange for a limited monopoly right to exclude anyone from making, 
using, or selling the claimed invention. The validity and scope of a patent 
claim are directly related to the information disclosed in the patent appli-
cation. A patent applicant can act strategically by withholding relevant in-
formation and applying for the broadest patent scope feasible. If the patent 
examiner misses the relevant prior art reference and grants a patent right 
with broad claims, the patent applicant could have her cake and eat it too—
she can keep the most useful information secret while being able to use the 
broad patent right to exclude competitors from making, using, or selling 
products and services embodying the claimed invention.  
However, as outlined in Part I,146 patent law has devised several tools 
to guard against these types of strategic behaviors by patent applicants. 
The many forms of the disclosure requirement—enablement, written de-
scription, definiteness, and “best mode”147—compel patent applicants to 
disclose information relevant for patent scope or validity. Failure to com-
ply with these requirements would result in the rejection of a patent appli-
cation or the invalidation and unenforceability of granted patents. These 
rules have the quality of information-forcing rules in that they elicit infor-
mation from the well-informed party for the benefit of a less informed 
party (patent examiner) or third party (a competitor, or the public). In this 
way, patent prosecution could be described as a negotiation between the 
patent applicant and the patent examiner.148  
Scholars have described other patent law doctrines as infor-
mation-forcing default rules. For instance, the doctrine of prosecution his-
tory estoppel, which restricts patent applicants from extending the scope 
of their claim during enforcement to areas that were abandoned during pa-
tent prosecution (negotiation), has been described as an information-forc-
ing rule.149 Patent applicants have a choice to make before applying for a 
patent and during patent prosecution. They can claim broadly and take a 
risk that the patent examiner may ask them to amend their claim, which 
means the amendment becomes part of the prosecution history, and thus 
the patent applicant is blocked from claiming the abandoned scope through 
the doctrine of equivalents.150 Alternatively, in anticipation of prosecution 
history estoppel, the applicant can submit a narrow claim that truly reflects 
the scope of the invention in the original application to avoid creating 
amendments that could be used against the applicant at a later stage.151 In 
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this sense, prosecution history estoppel functions as an information-forc-
ing rule that patent applicants can avoid by providing a more honest dis-
closure than they would have provided in the absence of such a require-
ment.152  
As discussed earlier,153 patent applicants have a duty of candor and 
good faith in dealing with the PTO. One of the main channels through 
which this duty is enforced is the inequitable conduct defense.154 Defend-
ants accused of patent infringement can point to inequitable conduct that 
the patentee engaged in during the patent application process, and if the 
defense is successful, all the claims in the patent application will be unen-
forceable.155 As the Federal Circuit put it, “the remedy for inequitable 
conduct is the ‘atomic bomb’ of patent law. Unlike validity defenses, 
which are claim specific . . . inequitable conduct regarding any single 
claim renders the entire patent unenforceable.”156 The inequitable conduct 
defense is designed to protect the integrity of the patent system by tapping 
into the power of private actors to investigate inequitable conduct.157  
The inequitable conduct defense is also another instance where patent 
law adopts a default-penalty rule that seeks to compel patent applicants to 
disclose useful information.158 As highlighted in the preceding paragraphs, 
patent applicants have both the incentive to withhold information damag-
ing to the scope of their patent and the expectation that patent examiners 
might not notice the lack of full disclosure, thereby granting them a 
broader patent right than is justified. While minimal disclosure is tempting 
for patent applicants, the potential risk of their whole patent becoming un-
enforceable because of inequitable conduct creates a huge incentive to pro-
vide full disclosure.159 Applicants can avoid this penalty by honestly 
providing all material information to the PTO.160 In this sense, the inequi-
table conduct doctrine functions as an information-eliciting default rule. 
In a general sense, both prosecution history estoppel and inequitable con-
duct rules are designed to ensure that patentees fulfill the part of the deal 
in the “social contract” they enter into with the public, which is the disclo-
sure of all material information about the claimed invention.  
2. The Requirement as Information Forcing 
The requirement that patent applicants disclose TK resources used in 
their inventive process should be conceived of as an information-forcing 
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rule compelling a patent applicant to divulge socially beneficial infor-
mation. Although the concept of requiring patent applicants to disclose the 
source of TK has been discussed in scholarship and in international nego-
tiations, this Article is the first to provide a detailed examination of the 
requirement as an information-forcing rule.  
To make the case for the conception of the requirement as an infor-
mation-forcing rule, it seems necessary to look at the dynamics between 
the parties involved and the effect the rule would have on these parties. As 
outlined by Ayres and Gertner,161 and other scholars who have examined 
the concept subsequently, information-forcing rules are best applied to 
scenarios involving: (1) a well-informed party; (2) who, based on infor-
mation asymmetry; (3) behaves strategically; (4) to block a socially bene-
ficial outcome from being realized. This Section will follow the same 
structure to make the case for the conception of the requirement as an in-
formation-forcing rule. 
a. The Well-Informed Party  
A useful grouping of the different parties within the universe of pa-
tent applications involves the patent applicant, the examiner, competitors, 
courts, and the public. Of these groups of participants, patent applicants 
are the most well-informed. Here, the term “patent applicant” refers to the 
group of people, including the inventor and patent attorney, involved in 
preparing the patent application. Considering a scenario in which a new 
and nonobvious invention is being claimed, the person who came up with 
the invention—the inventor—by definition, has the most relevant exper-
tise regarding the claimed invention.162 One can imagine the considerable 
time, energy, and expertise needed to develop a patentable invention. If 
other participants had the same level of information, they would have 
rushed to the PTO to apply for a patent right. Patent attorneys who work 
with the inventor and are hired to conduct prior art searches as part of the 
patent application will also have the most relevant information about the 
claimed invention. 
The other participants in the patent universe tend to have less infor-
mation than patent applicants. Patent examiners have scientific training 
and are expected to independently conduct prior art searches to decide 
whether the patent application is in fact valid. However, patent examiners 
cannot be expected to develop the same level of expertise in their prior art 
searches as an inventor who has developed an invention over time.163 Be-
cause the PTO is famously underfunded and patent examiners work under 
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tight schedules,164 one cannot expect examiners to spend the time and re-
sources required to develop the same level of expertise as the inventor or 
her attorney. In fact, the numbers show that the overwhelming amount of 
granted patents are either amended or invalidated.165 The other participants 
in the patent application process have even less chance of being exposed 
to the most relevant information. Competitors of the patent applicant may 
have some information about the claimed invention if they work in the 
same field of research as the inventor. However, another fact that compli-
cates the information provided in a patent application is that patent rights 
protect more than what is stated in the claim.166 The doctrine of equivalents 
expands the scope of patent rights to include activities considered to be 
“equivalent” to an element claimed in a patent application.167 This expan-
sive reading of claim language enables patent applicants to utilize vague 
wording and other claim drafting strategies to distort the real scope of a 
patent claim and increase the cost for observers of conducting a thorough 
investigation.168 Even if competitors may at some point be able to gather 
information comparable to the patent applicant, they would have to spend 
significant resources to do so. Ultimately, the patent applicant is the least-
cost provider of the most relevant information about the claimed invention.  
b. Information Asymmetry 
It is commonly accepted that there is significant information asym-
metry in patent prosecution.169 The ex parte nature of patent prosecution 
means that the patent applicant and examiner are the two key players at 
the heart of the process, and because of the dynamics outlined above, pa-
tent applicants tend to have more information about their invention than 
patent examiners. The role of patent examiners is therefore to investigate 
the credibility of the claims made by patent applicants based on the infor-
mation submitted to the examiners and after searching for relevant prior 
art.170 Although it is not conclusive, the large number of challenged patents 
  
 164. John R. Thomas, Collusion and Collective Action in the Patent System: A Proposal for 
Patent Bounties, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 305, 314, 316 (2001) (discussing the PTO budget and patent 
examiner dockets). 
 165. Jennifer Turchyn, Note, Improving Patent Quality Through Post-Grant Claim Amendment: 
A Comparison of European Opposition Proceedings and U.S. Post-Grant Proceedings, 114 MICH. L. 
REV. 1497, 1497 (2016) (highlighting, among other points, the increasing rate of patent invalidity 
created by the AIA); Steve Brachmann & Gene Quinn, Are More Than 90 Percent of Patents Chal-
lenged at the PTAB Defective?, IP WATCHDOG (June 14, 2017), http://www.ipwatch-
dog.com/2017/06/14/90-percent-patents-challenged-ptab-defective/id=84343. 
 166. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 606 (1950) (explaining the 
doctrine of equivalents through which the scope of a patent covers infringing activity that is equivalent 
to what is stated in the claims, even if it may not be literally identical to what is claimed). 
 167. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 520 U.S. 17, 21 (1997). 
 168. Long, supra note 159, at 669. 
 169. Jay P. Kesan, Carrots and Sticks to Create a Better Patent System, 17 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 763, 763 (2002) (noting that the common knowledge that the PTO has knowledge deficiency 
about the relevant prior art for claimed inventions, and suggesting multiple alternatives to address the 
problem). 
 170. Long, supra note 159, at 667. 
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being either amended or invalidated implies that information asymmetry 
may have enabled the granting of a patent right for undeserving patent 
applications.171 While some scholars have posited alternative measures of 
addressing this information asymmetry,172 the majority of patent law 
scholarship admits to the pervasiveness of unequal access to information. 
The information asymmetry that is observed in the patent system is 
even more pronounced in patent applications for inventions that rely on 
TK resources. That is because inaccessibility of TK resources is one of the 
main concerns regarding claims of biopiracy. Source communities that 
provide TK resources tend to reside in remote regions of the world, their 
TK is predominantly transmitted through oral traditions,173 and much of 
the codified knowledge is documented in inaccessible databases.174 It is 
revealing that many of the alleged acts of biopiracy are based on TK re-
sources that are well-known among members of the source community.175 
In the examples cited earlier, information asymmetry between the re-
searchers (patent applicants) and the patent examiners is to blame for the 
granting of patent rights for the process of using turmeric powder to heal 
surgical wounds or over neem tree extracts used as pesticides when gen-
erations of Indians have used the same plant extracts for the same pur-
pose.176  
c. Strategic Behavior  
The information asymmetry between the well-informed party (the pa-
tent applicant) and the patent examiner gives applicants considerable in-
centive and opportunity to act strategically by withholding the use of TK 
resources in their inventive process.177 Although patent applicants must 
  
 171. Id. at 663. 
 172. For instance, Mark Lemley has argued that patent applicants face high costs of conducting 
prior art searches. He therefore suggests that competitors should be encouraged to conduct these 
searches since they will only choose to challenge valuable patents and decide to selectively conduct 
prior art searches. See Lemley, supra note 30, at 1510. While Professor Lemley’s analysis does make 
sense if the policy question is who should conduct prior art searches, patent applicants are still the best 
low-cost providers of information in their possession—information that was used to develop the 
claimed invention. Because, in the current contexts, the information required of patent applicants is 
that which is already in their possession, eliciting such information from the patent applicant seems 
more efficient than encouraging competitors to conduct searches ex post. 
 173. Gebru, supra note 22, at 327 (discussing the prevalence of oral transmission of TK and 
suggesting legal intervention to encourage more codification). 
 174. The managers of the TKDL have worked to make the database accessible by, for instance, 
translating the contents of the database into multiple major international languages and by developing 
accessible classification methods. While this attempt is commendable, this level of accessibility is not 
matched by the other major TK databases from other jurisdictions. About TKDL, supra note 123. 
 175. ROBINSON, supra note 20 (listing the major cases of biopiracy involving patent applica-
tions). 
 176. Sahdeo Prasad & Bharat B. Aggarwal, Turmeric, the Golden Spice: From Traditional Med-
icine to Modern Medicine, in HERBAL MEDICINE: BIOMOLECULAR AND CLINICAL ASPECTS 263, 263 
(Iris F. F. Benzie & Sissi Wachtel-Galor eds., 2d ed. 2011). 
 177. Under the duty of candor and good faith, patent applicants are forbidden from withholding 
information material for patentability, so the worry is not so much that patent applicants will outright 
provide false information to the PTO. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2018). Because the duty of candor and good 
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disclose information deemed to be material for the patentability examina-
tion,178 they are not required to conduct extensive prior art search outside 
of what the inventor is exposed to during the inventive process; nor are 
they required to provide context to their claimed invention.179 Therefore, 
to get the broadest possible scope for their claims, patentees will only pro-
vide information the concealment of which would be a clear violation of 
their duty of disclosure. It is true that patentees may be worried about their 
patent being challenged by their competitors post-grant, but given that 
only a fraction of granted patents are challenged,180 this risk is minimal. In 
addition to being able to withhold information about the use of TK, patent 
applicants can use overly vague terms so that they can claim to have met 
their duty of disclosure if challenged at a later point. This practice of patent 
applicants using vague terms to benefit from the resulting confusion is not 
rare in patent practice,181 and it can be expected that patent applicants en-
gaged in biopiracy could make use of this practice as well. 
What is even more enabling of strategic behavior is that for centuries 
TK resources have been considered to be raw materials for the inventive 
process and part of the public domain—free for anyone to use.182 Thus, the 
omission of information about TK use in a patent application may not be 
seen as omission of material information. For example, Robert Larson, 
who was granted a patent right over a “process for preparing a storage 
stable neem seed extract,” knew of the benefits of the neem tree from the 
time he spent in India.183 However, the list of cited references only in-
cludes two other patent applications unrelated to the neem tree and six 
scientific articles that discuss various aspects of the benefits of the neem 
tree.184 He only mentions India twice, and even then in a very general sense 
to indicate that the tree grows in the country, among other places.185 The 
fact that farmers in India have been using the neem tree extracts as pesti-
cides—information that it is reasonable to expect he would have been 
exposed to as an importer of timber from India—is not cited anywhere in 
the granted patent or the document added during prosecution.186 Despite 
the omission of what seems to be material information, the patent was 
  
faith does not include a duty to conduct prior art searches, patent applicants could just claim that they 
were unaware of the existence of TK resources. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Wagner, supra note 29, at 215. 
 180. Only about 1-2% of granted patents are litigated. See, e.g., Jason Rantanen, Patents, Litiga-
tion and Reexaminations, PATENTLY-O (Dec. 29, 2011), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2011/12/pa-
tents-litigation-and-reexaminations.html. 
 181. See generally Stephen J. Stark, Key Words and Tricky Phrases: An Analysis of Patent 
Drafter’s Attempts to Circumvent the Language of 35 U.S.C. § 112, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 365, 366 
(1997) (discussing the “gray language” used by patent applicants). 
 182. The protectionist trend outlined in earlier sections seems to have followed the recognition, 
by the Convention on Biological Diversity, of some form of ownership over TK resources. See Con-
vention on Biological Diversity, supra note 21, at 1–2. 
 183. Stable Anti-Pest Neem Seed Extract, supra note 1; Shiva, supra note 2. 
 184. Stable Anti-Pest Neem Seed Extract, supra note 1. 
 185. Id. at Background of the Invention and Example I. 
 186. Certificate of Correction of U.S. Patent No. 4,556,562 (issued Dec. 3, 1985). 
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granted and remained valid for the life of the patent, even though the Eu-
ropean patent office invalidated an identical patent application after evi-
dence of the use of neem tree extract by one Indian firm was submitted to 
the office.187 Instead of being an example of an outlier case, the dynamics 
between the various participants in the neem tree patent issue is representa-
tive of the relationship between patent applicants and examiners in other 
cases in which biopiracy was alleged.188 
What may further complicate the information asymmetry in the use 
of TK is the confusion about the level of reliance required before patent 
applicants would have to disclose their use of TK resources. The level of 
reliance on TK resources could be put on a spectrum from minimal reli-
ance as an inspiration to a maximum reliance in which the patent applicant 
simply claims an element directly copied from TK or practice. It is not 
clear where in this spectrum the reliance attains a level that triggers an 
obligation to disclose TK use.189 Patent applicants can (and some do)190 
use this confusion to their benefit by not disclosing TK use and claiming, 
when challenged, that the TK or practice was only an inspiration. All these 
opportunities to withhold information enable patent applicants to benefit 
from the information asymmetry with minimal risk of patent invalidation. 
d. Undesirable Outcome  
The granting of patent rights for non-innovative or overly broad pa-
tent claims is an undesirable outcome, and this includes patent rights that 
relied on TK resources without disclosing that fact. The PTO has been 
criticized for granting patent rights to undeservingly broad claims, and the 
problems associated with such practice have been stated by many patent 
scholars.191 The monopolistic nature of patent rights is tolerated only be-
cause it is expected to provide incentives for inventors.192 If a patent right 
  
 187. See id.; Ulrike Hellerer & K.S. Jarayaman, Greens Persuade Europe to Revoke Patent on 
Neem Tree, 405 NATURE INT’L J. SCI. 266, 266 (2000). 
 188. For a non-exhaustive list of cases of biopiracy and detailed discussion, see ROBINSON, su-
pra note 20; see generally ABENA DOVE OSSEO-ASARE, BITTER ROOTS: THE SEARCH FOR HEALING 
PLANTS IN AFRICA 19 (2014). 
 189. See infra Section III.A.4 discusses what level of reliance should trigger a disclosure require-
ment. 
 190. The question of what level of reliance on TK resources should trigger the requirement is 
one of the key areas of contention on international deliberations. Additionally, a common theme in the 
defense that patent applicants in alleged acts of biopiracy raise is that their reliance on TK resources 
was only minimal or that they did not rely on such resource at all. Lack of novelty or non-obviousness 
has affected many of the patent applications invalidated after TK evidence is produced, which implies 
that the confusion regarding the level of reliance required to trigger TK resources is a big problem. 
ROBINSON, supra note 20 (discussing several alleged cases of biopiracy). 
 191. See, e.g., JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL JAMES MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, 
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 23 (2008); DAN L. BURK & MARK A. 
LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT 52 (2009); ADAM B. JAFFE & 
JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS 
ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 20 (2004). 
 192. The U.S. Constitution granted power to Congress “[t]o promote the progress of science and 
useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective 
writings and discoveries.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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is granted for a claimed element that is not new, is obvious, or has not been 
fully described, a monopoly is granted without the redeeming qualities of 
innovation. An idea that should be shared freely at no or low-cost ends up 
being locked up in an exclusive patent right for twenty years. Under the 
social contract theory of patents, the public gets less than what it bargained 
for while granting the exclusive right. There are multiple negative effects 
of granting patent rights to undeserving claims.  
Regarding financial costs, patent prosecution drains financial re-
sources of the patent applicant, the PTO, and the court system (if the patent 
is litigated post-grant). The cost of applying for a single patent could be 
anywhere between $10,000–$30,000,193 and that cost would be higher for 
the many applications that involve extensive negotiation with the exam-
iner over validity and scope. Although the PTO is funded through fees it 
collects for its services,194 the financial resources spent on patent prosecu-
tion are still a waste for the portion of patents that should not have been 
granted. Furthermore, there are opportunity costs of the human resources 
expended on the prosecution of undeserving patents.195 Then, there are 
costs of litigation196 at the different levels of appeal that many stakeholders 
want to reduce.197 Given that many stakeholders prioritize the reduction of 
litigation costs in the patent system, the adoption of an information-forcing 
rule that could create ex ante incentives198 that may reduce ex post costs 
of litigation seems highly beneficial.  
There are also costs associated with the granting of patent rights that 
may not readily be described as financial costs. Non-innovative or overly 
broad patents deter innovation in the relevant industry without providing 
anything in return.199 The existence of an overly broad patent that should 
  
 193. The cost of patenting, starting from initial filling and including multiple responses to office 
actions, etc., varies heavily based on the type of invention. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 30, at 1498; 
Gene Quinn, The Cost of Obtaining a Patent in the US, IP WATCHDOG (Apr. 4, 2015), http://www.ip-
watchdog.com/2015/04/04/the-cost-of-obtaining-a-patent-in-the-us/id=56485. 
 194. See, e.g., U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, FY 2018 PERFORMANCE AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 120–21 (2018), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/docu-
ments/USPTOFY18PAR.pdf. 
 195. See generally Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, Why “Bad” Patents Survive in the Market 
and How Should We change?—The Private and Social Costs of Patents, 55 EMORY L.J. 61, 87 (2006) 
(explaining the pressure under which patent examiners work that results in the granting of undeserving 
patent rights). 
 196. Professor Lemley had estimated the annual cost of patent litigation to be around $2.4 billion 
in 2001. Given the increasing complexity and number of patent cases, that number should be signifi-
cantly higher in recent years. See Lemley, supra note 30, at 1502. 
 197. The cost of litigation in patent law has been one of the issues of concern that the PTO, the 
courts, and the White House have been attempting to address. See, e.g., Lawrence Hurley, U.S. High 
Court Sets Record for Intellectual Property Caseload, REUTERS, Feb. 26, 2014, https://www.reu-
ters.com/article/us-usa-court-ip-analysis/u-s-high-court-sets-record-for-intellectual-property-case-
load-idUSBREA1Q09B20140227. 
 198. Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 77, 79 
(2005) (arguing for the benefit of creating ex ante incentives in the patent system). 
 199. There are many examples of patents being used to block innovation from developing in a 
certain field. See, e.g., Mildred K. Cho et al., Effects of Patents and Licenses on the Provision of 
Clinical Genetic Testing Services, 5 J. MOLECULAR DIAGNOSTICS 3, 5 (2003) (providing empirical 
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have either been invalidated or narrowed will have the effect of discour-
aging investment. Firms conducting research will fear that a patent right 
may be asserted against them at any point in the research and development 
(R&D) process.200 Additionally, vaguely worded claims create uncertainty 
about the “metes and bounds” of the patent right, thereby creating unnec-
essary risk for innovators.201  
There are other undesired outcomes particularly relevant to the con-
text of TK use in inventive processes. Biopiracy and the granting of unde-
serving patent rights over TK use have forced many source communities 
to mistrust researchers in general—and the patent system in particular.202 
This mistrust underpins the protectionist trend discussed earlier.203 Fur-
thermore, the granting of undeservingly broad patent rights, without rec-
ognizing the contributions of the source community, denies the commu-
nity any benefits from the resulting innovation. More broadly, the absence 
of recognition for the source community is a missed opportunity to create 
a more inclusive patent system in which source communities that provide 
TK resources and collaborate in research could feel a sense of belonging-
ness.  
3. Benefits of Disclosure  
The above discussion shows that the context in which patent appli-
cants use TK resources in their inventive process but withhold such infor-
mation from the PTO meets the requirements for the scenarios that Ayres 
and Gertner described in their article.204 The well-informed party (patent 
applicant) behaves strategically by using privately held information (with-
holding information about the reliance on TK resources) to get private 
benefits that are socially undesirable (undeservingly broad patent rights). 
Thus, the requirement should be designed as an information-forcing rule 
that would elicit socially desirable information from patent applicants.  
There are multiple benefits to the patent system when the requirement 
is complied with. The production of complete information benefits the 
  
evidence of clinicians shying away from clinical testing because of the threat of patent infringement 
or licensing costs); Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The 
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 698 (1998) (describing the proliferation of 
patent right as being one of the problems barring the production of useful products and services in the 
biomedical field). 
 200. The term research and development (R&D) is used to refer to the variety of steps that firms 
take from the inception of an idea up to the point of marketing products. 
 201. Adam B. Jaffe & Josh Lerner, Innovation and Its Discontents, 6 INNOVATION POL’Y & 
ECON. 27, 32 (2006). 
 202. Alison L. Hoare & Richard G. Tarasofsky, Asking and Telling: Can “Disclosure of Origin” 
Requirements in Patent Applications Make a Difference?, 10 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 149, 150 
(2007). 
 203. See supra Section II.B. 
 204. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 37. 
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PTO, source communities, competitors, and the public. First, it will in-
crease the quality of issued patents205 by rejecting non-innovative claims 
and by making issued patents provide more socially beneficial infor-
mation. The requirement will mean that the patent applicant discloses one 
of the key sources of input for her invention. This may lead patent exam-
iners, who usually have considerable resource constraints,206 to use these 
limited resources efficiently and target prior art from source communities 
in their examination. This is especially useful in the TK context because 
patent examiners usually focus on accessible sources such as patents or 
scientific publications in their examination, while the overwhelming ma-
jority of TK is unpublished.207 
Second, it will raise the cost of prosecuting low-value patents, 
thereby enabling the use of PTO resources for more inventive claims208: 
claims that improve on TK resources. Requiring applicants to disclose TK 
use will increase the risk of invalidity of low-quality patents. Therefore, 
the value of applying for these types of patents will significantly decrease, 
while the added burden of complying with the requirement will increase 
costs, albeit only slightly. If the quality of patent is very low, the require-
ment would change the cost-benefit analysis of such applications and dis-
incentivize those types of applicants from going to the PTO. Third, the 
patent office receives information essential for patent examination from 
the least-cost provider (the patent applicant), which should reduce the cost 
of prosecuting inventions that rely on TK resources. The PTO already has 
over seventy TK databases that it can use to search for prior art.209 How-
ever, the databases are not comprehensive compared to the wealth of 
knowledge held by indigenous and local communities.210 Therefore, patent 
examiners would face transaction costs of accessing TK resources that are 
not documented or are documented in a foreign language. Requiring the 
applicant to disclose TK use will transfer the cost of prior art search to the 
least cost provider: the patent applicant. 
Compliance with the requirement will also have benefits for the 
source communities. Source jurisdictions that have passed legislation on 
TK access and benefit sharing can track the use of TK by researchers and 
  
 205. Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 198, at 70–71. 
 206. See generally Kesan & Gallo, supra note 195, at 66 (explaining the pressure under which 
patent examiners work, which results in the granting of undeserving patent rights). 
 207. See Gebru, supra note 22, at 303. 
 208. See Parchamovsky & Wagner, supra note 198, at 71. 
 209. Alphabetical Listing of All TK Resources, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. (Mar. 24, 2016, 
4:18 PM), https://www.uspto.gov/learning-and-resources/support-centers/scientific-and-technical-in-
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 210. It is generally understood that the majority of the knowledge of indigenous peoples is un-
documented and thus the databases that the PTO uses will include the undocumented knowledge of 
the different indigenous communities around the world. See, e.g., Ghate Utkarsh, Documentation of 
Traditional Knowledge: People’s Biodiversity Registers, in TRADING IN KNOWLEDGE: DEVELOPMENT 
PERSPECTIVES ON TRIPS, TRADE, AND SUSTAINABILITY 190, 191 (Christophe Bellman et al. eds., 
2003). 
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enforce obligations arising out of these rules more efficiently by searching 
for TK use through accessible patent databases. Source communities and 
countries that engage in protectionism out of fear of biopiracy can be more 
confident that they can enforce domestic legislation abroad on researchers 
who gain access to TK resources. This confidence can, in turn, be expected 
to result in a more collaborative and trusting relationship211 between the 
various stakeholders involved in bioprospecting.  
Compliance with the requirement would also enable competitors of 
the applicant or source communities to challenge the validity or scope of 
the claimed invention using the ex ante TK disclosure. Given the self-in-
terest of competitors or source communities, the full force of the private 
actor could be used as a tool to check the validity or scope of a patent 
application. Following the AIA, third parties now have four different types 
of challenges to a patent right: pre-issuance review, inter partes review, 
post-grant review, and Covered Business Method Patent Review.212 A bi-
oprospecting relationship in which researchers have increased access to 
TK resources can be expected to result in the production of biopharmaceu-
tical products cheaply and quickly. To achieve this socially desirable 
outcome, the requirement should create the right incentives without im-
posing too much burden on patent applicants or the patent system.  
4. Guidance for Policy 
The information-forcing rule literature offers guidance on how to 
craft an effective and efficient requirement. A well-drafted requirement 
would be able to address concerns around legal uncertainty and innova-
tion-deterring burdens while still being able to encourage the disclosure of 
reliance on TK. If a default rule is to succeed in compelling information 
from a well-informed party, it should be designed against the interest of 
that party.213 It is because of this rule that the well-informed party reveals 
the socially beneficial information. In the current context, the requirement 
should create a penalty against the interest of an applicant, which points to 
the need to adopt penalties of patent invalidity for applications that violate 
the requirement. If the requirement is to be effective, the default-penalty 
rule should put the patent applicant in a worse position than she would 
have been in had she taken a risk and the risk materialized.  
Three levels of reliance on TK could be used to further extrapolate 
the trigger of an obligation under the requirement. First, the minimal level 
of reliance could be described as “mere inspiration”—the inventor was in-
spired by what she understood from TK, but the traditional practice was 
  
 211. Source communities increasingly mistrust the patent system because it has been used as a 
tool for biopiracy. See Hoare & Tarasofsky, supra note 202. The requirement has the potential of 
developing trusting relationships. 
 212. 35 U.S.C. §§ 122(e), 311, 321 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.302 (2018). 
 213. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 37, at 98. 
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not relevant for the development of the claimed invention. A relevant ex-
ample here may be the rosy periwinkle plant, which is native to Madagas-
car and was traditionally used to treat diabetes.214 Scientists at Eli Lilly 
and the University of Western Ontario, after years of research, learned that 
the plant has cancer-fighting qualities.215 Eli Lilly used extracts from the 
plant to develop vinblastine and vincristine—medicines used to treat 
Hodgkin’s disease and childhood leukemia.216 If the TK of using the plant 
for diabetes or processes of extracting ingredients did not contribute to the 
development of vinblastine and vincristine,217 then the duty to disclose the 
source of TK would be unreasonably burdensome. The inventors in this 
case were inspired to test it for its cancer-treating potential after being 
exposed to the traditional use of the plant to treat diabetes. Therefore, the 
traditional use is not “material for patentability.” The claimed invention is 
not substantively based on the TK. Thus, the scope of the patent right that 
will ultimately issue is not affected by disclosure of the minimal input 
from TK. Under this scenario, the patent applicant has an incentive to 
abide by the requirement because the applicant has nothing to lose—dis-
closure will not affect the patent scope. However, as explained in Part I,218 
the duty of candor and good faith is broader than the duty to disclose ma-
terial information. Any information that an examiner might have wanted 
to know should be included in this broader requirement of candor and good 
faith. Still, the patent applicants have an incentive to disclose the tradi-
tional use of the rosy periwinkle to treat diabetes for the same reason stated 
earlier.219 
Second, a higher level of reliance on TK could be described as “sub-
stantial reliance” and could fairly give rise to a duty to disclose under 35 
U.S.C. § 112 and Rule 56. Substantial reliance is a situation where, with-
out access to the TK, the invention may not have been produced, or the 
process would have taken significantly more time or resources. The neem 
tree case discussed in the introduction to this Article is a good example of 
this. Presuming that Mr. Larson knew that Indian farmers have been using 
the neem tree extract as a pesticide and presuming a storage stable neem 
tree extract was not in prior use, his patent application for a storage stable 
neem tree extract to be used as a pesticide should be thought of as having 
substantially relied on TK. This is especially the case if, as claimed by 
  
 214. MICHAEL F. BROWN, WHO OWNS NATIVE CULTURE? 136 (2003). 
 215. Srividhya Ragavan, Protection of Traditional Knowledge, MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV., 
2001, at 8; Roger A. Sedjo, Property Rights, Genetic Resources, and Biotechnological Change, 35 
J.L. & ECON. 199, 199 (1992). 
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(1993). 
 217. BROWN, supra note 214, at 137 (discussing the challenges of assigning ownership in the 
Rosy Periwinkle case). 
 218. See supra Section I.A. 
 219. See supra Section I.A. As discussed earlier, this is because failure to disclose a material 
information may result in the invalidation of the patent right post-grant. See 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2018); 
see also 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2018). 
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representatives of W.R. Grace, the claimed compound and process re-
sulted in increasing the stability of the extract from a couple of days to two 
years.220 In this case, Mr. Larson and the scientists involved in the second 
W.R. Grace patent should disclose that extracts of the neem tree have been 
used in India as a pesticide because such information is “material for pa-
tentability.” The improvement in stability of the compound depends on the 
extent of the traditional use in a stable neem tree extract.  
In this second scenario, the level of reliance on TK is so substantial 
that “but for” the use of TK, the claimed invention would not have been 
developed. If the improvement does not develop something totally differ-
ent, disclosure of “substantial reliance” on TK under this scenario may 
narrow the scope of the patent right. If the penalty default is the reduction 
of patent scope (or other similarly weak penalties such as the temporary 
suspension of prosecution), the applicant would have an incentive to with-
hold information in hopes that the PTO or third parties will not discover 
the information on their own. In other words, if the ex post discovery of a 
violation of the requirement results in the same outcomes as an ex ante 
disclosure, then the applicant has hardly any incentive to disclose. There-
fore, legislators would need to address this incentive to withhold infor-
mation by setting up a penalty resulting in the rejection of an application 
or the invalidity of a granted patent. 
The highest level of reliance could be a claim to an “invention” that 
provides only minimal improvement on TK. Patent law standards of nov-
elty221 and nonobviousness222 may be helpful here. The improvement 
would be minimal if the traditional use of the resource anticipates it or if 
it would be obvious to the average person in that field with knowledge of 
the relevant TK. A good example here is the patenting of a process for 
treating wounds by applying turmeric powder. In 1995, two researchers at 
the University of Mississippi Medical Center, Soman K. Das and Hari Har 
P. Cohly, received a U.S. patent.223 The patent covered a method of ad-
ministering turmeric powder orally and topically to heal surgical wounds 
and ulcers.224 People in India had used turmeric powder to treat wounds 
for centuries.225 The Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), 
an agency of the Indian government, challenged the validity of the patent 
in the PTO.226 The Council submitted thirty-two printed publications from 
India providing evidence of the use of turmeric powder to heal wounds for 
centuries.227 The PTO revoked all six claims in the patent for failing to 
  
 220. Shayana Kadidal, Subject-Mattter Imperialism? Biodiversity, Foreign Prior Art, and the 
Neem Patent Controversy, 37 IDEA 371, 374–75 (1997). 
 221. 35 U.S.C. § 102. 
 222. Id. § 103. 
 223. Use of Turmeric in Wound Healing, U.S. Patent No. 5,401,504 (issued Mar. 28, 1995). 
 224. Id. 
 225. Prasad & Aggarwal, supra note 176, at 264. 
 226. Re-examination Certificate of U.S. Patent No. 5,401,504 (issued Apr. 21, 1998). 
 227. Id. 
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meet substantive patentability requirements.228 Information about the reli-
ance of TK in these scenarios is obviously material for patentability anal-
ysis. The patent application in this and other similar cases229 is claiming 
rights over the traditional uses of a resource, provides only a minimal im-
provement or, in the worst of cases, no improvement is made to TK at all. 
In these cases, Rule 56 would require the disclosure of TK.230 Furthermore, 
the patent application in most of these cases will fail to meet the patenta-
bility requirements. 
In this third scenario, the patent applicant has an incentive to violate 
the requirement because compliance with the rule will result in the same 
outcome as the penalty. In this scenario, the requirement will have little 
incentive to disclose reliance on TK because the penalty for violation is 
the same as the outcome from compliance. Thus, policy makers should 
adopt a harsher penalty than patent invalidity. This includes disgorgement 
of profits or levying fines. One additional benefit of the requirement to 
note is that the penalty default will discourage researchers from going to 
the PTO before making a considerable improvement on TK resources, 
which is a socially desirable outcome. Thus, in addition to compelling in-
formation from applicants, the requirement may impact patenting behav-
ior. The three scenarios outlined above are a simplified version of what 
might happen in bioprospecting projects, and they are used here to illus-
trate the various incentive structure of the patent applicant.  
Conceiving the requirement as an information-forcing default rule 
solves two of the three issues of concern. First, it solves the questions of 
what type of penalty to impose for violations of the requirement. If the 
requirement is conceived of as an information-forcing rule, then the pen-
alty for infringement in the first two cases would have to be a rejection of 
a patent application and invalidity of a granted patent. For the third sce-
nario, because the applicant knows she does not have a patentable inven-
tion in the first place, patent invalidity will not be sufficient. In these types 
of cases, a harsher penalty such as disgorgement of profits or fines is 
needed to compel information.  
  
 228. Id. Although the turmeric case shows a patent system working as it is supposed to, many 
similar cases take many years of litigation and considerable expenses. One can imagine the numerous 
cases in which TK may be used but remains unreported. See, e.g., ROBINSON, supra note 20. 
 229. There are multiple examples of cases in which the patent applicant simply requests patent 
rights without making significant improvements. For instance, a Dutch company has received patents 
in numerous countries over a gluten-free flour made from teff. Teff is a flour native to Ethiopia and 
Eritrea and an input in injera, which is a spongy flat bread and a ubiquitous part of everyday meals in 
both countries. The gluten-free nature of the flour is a natural result of the teff flour. While the U.S. 
patent has been invalidated, a very similar European patent (Eur. Patent No. 1646287b1) is still in 
force. See REGINE ANDERSEN & TONE WINGE, FRIDTJOF NANSENS INSTITUTE, THE ACCESS AND 
BENEFIT-SHARING AGREEMENT ON TEFF GENETIC RESOURCES: FACTS AND LESSONS (2012),  
http://www.abs-initiative.info/fileadmin/media/Knowledge_Center/Pulications/FNI/FNI-R0612.pdf. 
 230. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2018). 
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For the first two scenarios, anything short of patent invalidity or non-
enforcement would fail to encourage patent applicants to disclose their re-
liance on TK resources. A voluntary system in which patent applicants 
will face no repercussions for noncompliance would mean a reasonable 
applicant would not risk patent invalidity or the reduction of the scope of 
her patent by providing potentially damaging information. There are no 
benefits to doing so unless the applicant wants to fulfill some form of 
moral obligation. The cost-benefit analysis is similar under a regime in 
which the penalty is suspension of patent prosecution. If, for example, Mr. 
Larson’s patent over storage stable neem tree extract would be narrowed 
down upon his disclosure of traditional practices in India, he would ini-
tially take a risk of noncompliance. If on the off chance that the patent 
examiner discovers the traditional practice in India (which in most cases 
is very unlikely), then Mr. Larson can comply with the requirement. This 
would result in most applicants being noncompliant. 
Most cases of bioprospecting or biopiracy can be expected to fall un-
der either the first or second scenario. This is because TK tends to involve 
basic information231 about the benefits of biodiversity resources on which 
researchers could relatively easily make considerable improvements. For 
example, Indian farmers had used the neem tree as a pesticide for centu-
ries,232 but the PTO found Mr. Larson’s “improvement”233 of creating a 
storage stable neem tree extract innovative enough to grant it a patent.234 
Furthermore, because of the uncertainty regarding the validity of a patent 
application, patent applicants can reasonably expect that the scope of their 
patent application will only be narrowed rather than completely rejected. 
While a penalty is needed to encourage patent applicants to divulge 
information, legislators should also consider the impact that such rules 
may have on the incentive to obtain the information in the first place.235 
One of the costs of the requirement is that the duty to disclose may dis-
courage researchers from using TK resources in the first place.236 Thus, 
legislators should ensure the requirement is an efficient one—that there 
are sufficient incentives for researchers to use TK resources while ensur-
ing that such use is disclosed to the PTO.  
Second, the information-forcing rule’s literature provides answers to 
the question of whether to request that patent applicants disclose the 
  
 231. Carvalho, supra note 111, at 244–45 (discussing the ease with which users can copy TK); 
Mark C. Suchman, Invention and Ritual: Notes on the Interrelation of Magic and Intellectual Property 
in Preliterate Societies, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1264, 1272 (1989) (describing the basic nature of TK). 
 232. BD. ON SCI. & TECH. FOR INT’L DEV., supra note 8, at 1. 
 233. Stable Anti-Pest Neem Seed Extract, supra note 1. 
 234. Id. 
 235. While penalizing nondisclosure has the effect of encouraging disclosure, if the penalty is so 
significant, researchers may hesitate to acquire the information in the first place for fear of the potential 
of being penalized. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 37, at 128. 
 236. Hoare & Tarasofsky, supra note 202, at 164. 
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original source (or origin) of TK or just the source from which they re-
ceived the resource. This is an important issue because many researchers 
access TK through intermediaries such as research databases, databanks, 
or gene banks.237 Many TK resources are conserved and used by multiple 
communities, and these resources have predominantly been transmitted to 
other cultures near and far.238 As per the information-forcing rules litera-
ture, forcing well-informed parties to incur further costs may block a trans-
action from taking place.239 The requirement of disclosing origin (as op-
posed to source) may discourage researchers from using TK in the first 
place. Therefore, the requirement should not compel patent applications to 
conduct prior art searches more than they already did during the research 
that led to a claimed invention. If the penalty of patent invalidity, disgorge-
ment of profits, and fines are adopted, then a requirement to conduct an 
additional search for relevant TK resources would be too tasking. This is 
especially the case given the inaccessibility of TK resources and the chal-
lenges of tracking original sources. Therefore, the requirement should only 
require that patent applicants disclose TK-related information the re-
searcher used and discovered in the normal course of research rather than 
imposing a positive obligation to disclose the original source of TK or 
other relevant information.240  
In addition to the ex ante benefits of compelling patent applicants to 
disclose potentially damaging information, the requirement has important 
ex post benefits. As explained earlier, patent examiners are at a disad-
vantage because of the information asymmetry inherent in patent prosecu-
tion.241 The disclosure of reliance on TK would enable competitors of the 
applicant, source communities, and the public to assess the validity or 
scope of claimed inventions. This ex post benefit harnesses the private in-
terest of competitors and source communities in ensuring the applicant 
does not get a broader patent right than she deserves. This ex post benefit 
is essential given the significant resource restraints that the PTO faces. The 
ex post benefits of disclosure also include the facilitation of the enforce-
ment of rules around access to TK and benefit sharing that source commu-
nities and countries may have established. Furthermore, just like the gen-
eral disclosure requirement is useful in creating spillover effects from the 
disclosure of useful information to the public, the disclosure of reliance on 
TK in the development of a claimed invention may encourage competitors 
of the applicant to research the TK for similar purposes. The value of such 
  
 237. See GRAHAM DUTFIELD, QUAKER UNITED NATIONS OFFICE, OCCASIONAL PAPER 18, 
THINKING ALOUD ON DISCLOSURE OF ORIGIN 3 (2005). 
 238. See OGUAMANAM, supra note 23, at 18; see also MANUEL RUIZ MULLER, INT’L CTR. FOR 
TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEV., ISSUE PAPER 3, PROTECTING SHARED AND WIDELY DISTRIBUTED 
TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE: ISSUES, CHALLENGES AND OPTIONS 8–9 (2013). 
 239. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 37, at 128. 
 240. Patent applicants do not have an obligation to conduct prior art searches. Their obligation 
is to disclose material information in their possession. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2018). 
 241. See supra Section III.A.2.b. 
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information may be significant given reports of bioprospectors focusing 
on selected TK resources for further investigation.242  
Lastly, one of the recurring challenges in the literature on bio-
prospecting is understanding the actual value of TK resources in bio-
prospecting projects. While source communities and some scholars argue 
that the resources have considerable value,243 some firms argue that they 
either do not use TK at all,244 or that the value of such resources is very 
minimal.245 The lack of information about the extent of the reliance of the 
industry on TK contributes to the confusion on the correct policy measure 
that should govern bioprospecting projects. The requirement could address 
this concern by providing clear information on the value of TK as an input 
in inventive ideas. This does not mean that the full value of TK could be 
evaluated based on the disclosure in patent applications. But disclosure 
could shed some light on the value that should be put on TK as an input in 
producing innovative products. 
B.  Reversing the Protectionist Trend  
A requirement designed as an information-forcing rule will have in-
novation-encouraging effects instead of being a burden on the patent sys-
tem as argued by some. The requirement has the potential to reverse the 
rising and inefficient protectionist trend outlined earlier. To achieve this 
goal, the requirement would have to strike a balance between interests of 
source communities and TK users246 such as researchers and modern 
firms. If the requirement addresses the interests of source communities 
without meeting the needs of users, then the intervention might discourage 
the engagement that users would have with TK. If the requirement ad-
dresses the interests of users without satisfying the needs of source com-
munities, it will fail to change the current trends of protectionism. 
The past experiences of researchers accessing TK, developing prod-
ucts, and failing to recognize the contributions of the source community 
have created significant trust issues.247 Decades of alleged biopiracy have 
made source communities hesitant to share their resource. To overcome 
this mistrust, a robust and clear signal of change from the status quo is 
needed. Because existing patent law is considered to be part of the problem 
  
 242. See Rausser & Small, supra note 96, at 173. 
 243. See supra Section II.A for a discussion of the value of TK. 
 244. See Dominic Keating, The WIPO IGC: A U.S. Perspective, in THE WIPO 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMM. ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. & GENETIC RES., TRADITIONAL 
KNOWLEDGE & FOLKLORE, PROTECTING TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE 265, 271 (Daniel F. Robinson, 
Ahmed Abdel-Latif & Pedro Roffe eds. 2017). 
 245. See Jim Chen, There’s No Such Thing as Biopiracy . . . And It’s a Good Thing Too, 37 
MCGEORGE L. REV. 1, 25–28 (2006). 
 246. The term “users” refers to multiple entities that rely on TK in their inventive process. This 
includes for-profit firms, public research institutions, and independent researchers. 
 247. See Shiva & Holla-Bhar, supra note 10, at 151. 
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by source communities,248 minor tinkering may fail to send the strong sig-
nal needed to reverse the protectionist trend.  
The introduction of the requirement should take into consideration its 
effects on users. Users can be expected to be interested in legal certainty 
about the contents of the requirement and penalties for violations.249 Re-
searchers interested in using TK resources may be discouraged if they have 
doubts about their obligations and potential penalties. Additionally, users 
with a for-profit orientation can also be expected to emphasize costs asso-
ciated with access to TK and requests for benefit sharing if an innovative 
product is produced. Policy makers should seriously consider these inter-
ests to craft an efficient and workable requirement.  
The requirement can undo the lose–lose relationship in the status quo 
by giving source communities (the party with weaker bargaining power) 
some leverage to enforce rules that the community may place around ac-
cess and benefit sharing. This leverage can encourage source communities 
and biodiversity-rich countries to be more open and willing to engage in 
R&D collaborations with researchers. 
The use of databases provides a good example of how a collaborative 
relationship between source communities and users would work. Instead 
of screening resources for potential value, researchers could use the 
knowledge of indigenous peoples and local communities as research leads. 
Take the example of the TKDL. The more than 250,000 medicinal formu-
lations documented in the database could be a great source to develop 
modern drugs. A collaborative (as opposed to restrictive) use of the con-
tents could create significant welfare gains for patients everywhere. Bio-
pharmaceutical firms could use their impressive resources to screen the 
database for promising research leads. However, in the absence of an ef-
fective mechanism that can convince source communities that they will 
share from the benefits arising out of follow-on innovation, they may not 
be willing to engage in this collaborative and welfare-enhancing endeavor. 
IV. INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS  
If one accepts that the requirement should be introduced, then several 
institutional questions arise. This Section outlines the institutional mecha-
nism for introducing the requirement in U.S. patent law. It argues that 
amending the Patent Act to introduce an explicit requirement compelling 
applicants to disclose the source of TK may be the most effective mecha-
nism to signal a change in U.S. patent policy and establish confidence 
among source communities and countries. However, amending U.S. patent 
law to introduce the requirement seems infeasible given the lack of politi-
cal interest to introduce such an amendment and the considerable opposi-
tion that may be expected from industry. Therefore, this Section suggests 
  
 248. Id. at 152. 
 249. See Tim Roberts, The Protection of Traditional Knowledge: An Industry View, in U.N. 
CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., supra note 92, at 93, 93. 
2019] PATENTS, DISCLOSURE, AND BIOPIRACY 577 
that clarifying the duties of disclosure, candor, and good faith that patent 
applications already have, by explicitly introducing the requirement, 
would be a feasible second-best measure. It also argues that the PTO, as 
the most suitable administrative agency for patent examination, should be 
tasked with checking for compliance with the requirement. 
The key institutional questions that may arise include: (1) How 
should the requirement be formalized?; (2) Which entity is best suited to 
check for compliance?; (3) What should be the content of the required dis-
closure?; (4) What should trigger the obligation?; (5) What should be the 
penalty for noncompliance?; and (6) Who should have standing? These 
questions are dealt with in further detail below.  
A. How Should the Requirement Be Formalized?  
Considering the twin goals of compelling socially beneficial infor-
mation from patent applicants and reversing a rising protectionist trend, 
amending the Patent Act to introduce an explicit requirement may be the 
most effective mechanism. The many cases of biopiracy happened in the 
face of existing disclosure obligations under U.S. patent law. Therefore, 
an explicit amendment of the Patent Act would send a strong signal of 
policy change in U.S. patent policy and would establish confidence among 
source communities and countries. This strong signal is needed to reverse 
the rising protectionist trend in which source communities and countries 
create barriers to access TK. Dozens of countries around the world, includ-
ing some industrialized nations, have amended their patent act to introduce 
the requirement.250 Although it is too early to observe the impact of the 
reform, early evidence suggests that there have not been significant nega-
tive effects in the domestic patent systems of these countries.251 
Reforming U.S. patent law to reflect policy changes is not a new en-
deavor. The Patent Act has been amended multiple times since its first 
iteration in 1790252 with the most recent amendment—the AIA253—
enacted in 2011 to modernize the U.S. patent system. Therefore, amending 
the Patent Act to include the requirement is not an implausible idea. In 
fact, the 1980 Bayh-Dole amendment254 to the Patent Act has similar fea-
tures to the requirement. The AIA brought about major changes in U.S. 
  
 250. For a latest list of countries with some form of a requirement to disclose the source of TK 
used in the inventive process, see WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENT 
TABLE (2017), 
www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/tk/en/documents/pdf/genetic_resources_disclosure.pdf. 
 251. See Bagley, supra note 16, at 736–40. 
 252. Patents Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (1970). 
 253. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011). 
 254. The Bayh-Dole amendment is codified in 35 U.S.C. Chapter 18. While there are many sim-
ilarities between the requirement and the disclosure required under the Bayh-Dole Act, there are sig-
nificant limitations. While the subject matter of both requirements deals with upstream innovation, 
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patentability requirement, while most TK resources do not meet core patentability requirements. 
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patent law, one of which relates to a disclosure requirement. The Act man-
dates that any invention that uses federal funds in the inventive process 
include, on the face of issued patents, a disclosure of the government’s 
interest in the patent.255 The Bayh-Dole disclosure has enabled the U.S. 
government to track federally funded inventions, thereby facilitating the 
enforcement of obligations that the inventor and contractors have under 
the Act.256 A carefully crafted requirement can have a similar tracking ef-
fect in facilitating the enforcement of access and benefit-sharing agree-
ments between source communities or countries and researchers.257  
However, amending U.S. patent law to introduce the requirement 
seems infeasible considering the lack of political interest in the amend-
ment and the considerable opposition that may be expected from the in-
dustry. Therefore, clarifying the duties of disclosure, candor, and good 
faith that patent applicants already have by introducing an explicit require-
ment would be a feasible second-best measure. As stated earlier, patent 
applicants already have a very broad duty of disclosure as stated in the 
Patent Act, under federal rules, and in the case law.258 Thus, updating the 
federal rules and the PTO manual to include an explicit requirement would 
be an efficient and feasible reform that can satisfy the twin benefits iden-
tified in this Article.  
B. Which Institution Is Best Suited?  
The general duty of disclosure is owed to the PTO. The requirement 
imposed on patent applicants to describe the invention in “full, clear, con-
cise, and exact terms” relates to the specification section of a patent appli-
cation.259 The first entity that examines the patent application, including 
the specification section, is the PTO. Although courts have the power to 
review the validity of granted patents, there is a presumption of patent va-
lidity260 and a level of deference courts grant the PTO prosecution.261 Fur-
thermore, the rules under 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) clearly state that the duty of 
  
 255. 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(6) (2018). The provision highlights the disclosure requirement that 
should be inserted in funding agreements. It states that contractor has an obligation “to include within 
the specification of such application and any patent issuing thereon, a statement specifying that the 
invention was made with Government support.” Id. 
 256. WENDY H. SCHACHT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32076, THE BAYH-DOLE ACT: 
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 258. See supra Section I.A. 
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disclosure exists “in dealing with the Office.”262 These rules extends be-
yond the examiner to include anyone at the PTO.263 It seems that the rules 
direct the general duty to disclose towards the PTO, at least initially, be-
cause it is the most suitable entity to check for compliance with the rules. 
Since the duty of disclosure is directed at the PTO, it seems reasonable to 
also direct a duty to disclose to the same organ. This should especially be 
the case if the requirement is introduced through an updated MPEP that 
includes an explicit requirement.  
The literature from administrative law supports this conclusion. The 
general theory in administrative law is that administrative agencies are 
best suited to interpret rules governing activities in their area of exper-
tise.264 This theory also applies in deciding the level of information that 
should be submitted for proceedings in that agency.265 Given the unique 
position of the Federal Circuit as a specialized appeals court for patent 
cases, patent law was considered to be different from regulatory areas 
where administrative law theories applied.266 However, the AIA granted 
the PTO considerable administrative power to decide key issues regarding 
patent validity.267 Considering its newly expanded powers, the PTO should 
be the first entity that decides whether an applicant has complied with the 
requirement. This conclusion is further supported by the fact that the PTO 
has considerable expertise—both regarding technical knowledge and pa-
tent prosecution. This, however, does not mean that the Patent Trials and 
Appeals Board (PTAB) or the courts should not review these decisions. 
The requirement, like other requirements in U.S. patent law, should be re-
viewable by the courts. 
C. What Should Be the Content of the Required Disclosure? 
As highlighted in earlier Sections,268 the requirement should entail an 
obligation to disclose the source from which the patent applicant received 
TK instead of the origin of the resource. Requiring patent applicants to 
conduct further research to identify the original source of the TK would 
create a considerable disincentive against relying on TK resources. The 
origin of the majority of TK resources is controversial and, therefore, re-
quiring researchers to investigate and disclose the origin creates a duty that 
  
 262. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2018). 
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is far from the scientific research in which firms have expertise.269 As the 
information-forcing rules literature reveals, rules should not be applied if 
the net effect could result in a disincentive to participate in the “deal” in 
the first place.270 Limiting the content of required disclosure only to the 
source from which the applicant received TK ensures that the requirement 
does not impose an undue burden that may deter innovation.271 This may 
create an opportunity for strategic behavior where patent applicants would 
select a jurisdiction that does not have domestic access and benefit-sharing 
rules to avoid having to comply with rules in the actual source jurisdiction. 
But, because this risk seems highly limited considering the heavy penalty 
for fraud and inequitable conduct, legislators should not drive away re-
searchers for fear of such a limited risk of strategic behavior. 
D. What Should Trigger the Obligation?  
Based on the three levels of reliance outlined earlier, the trigger for 
the requirement should be a substantial reliance standard. Patent appli-
cants should have a duty to disclose if they would not have developed the 
claimed invention or if the invention would take considerable time and 
resources without the reliance on TK. This includes examples such as the 
neem tree patent where the development of storage stable neem tree extract 
for use as a pesticide would face additional risks had it not been for the 
traditional use of the resource as a pesticide.272  
A broad interpretation of “substantial reliance” is suggested in this 
Article. The balance between requiring a specific type of reliance (sub-
stantial) but accepting a broad range of inputs as triggering the requirement 
strikes an efficient balance that would meet a key purpose of the require-
ment—disclosure of relevant information without significantly affecting 
the incentive to innovate. Such a standard is expected to encourage source 
communities to provide increased access to TK resources while ensuring 
that they are not cheated out of their equitable share by strategic patent 
claim drafting. 
E. What Should Be the Penalty for Noncompliance? 
Countries around the world have adopted a wide range of penalties 
for noncompliance with their domestic requirement to disclose the source 
of TK used in inventive processes.273 These penalties include the suspen-
sion of a patent application until the applicant fulfills her obligation under 
the requirement, the rejection of the patent application, and the invalidity 
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or unenforceability of a granted patent. Some jurisdictions have also 
adopted criminal sanctions in the form of fines or imprisonment. In con-
trast to these penalties, some jurisdictions have adopted a voluntary system 
in which patent applicants are encouraged to disclose TK, but noncompli-
ance will have no repercussion.274  
The penalty for noncompliance advocated for in this Article ranges 
from the rejection of the patent application or (if a patent application has 
been granted) the invalidity or unenforceability of the patent right, to fines, 
and disgorgement of profits in extreme cases. The twin functions of the 
requirement outlined below—its information-forcing function275 and the 
reversal of a rising protectionist trend276—would not be satisfied if the re-
quirement is voluntary. If patent applicants are left to their own will in 
disclosing potentially damaging information about their reliance on TK 
resources, it can be presumed that a reasonable applicant would choose to 
withhold such information. The information-forcing nature of the require-
ment emanates from a penalty rule that is set against the interest of the 
well-informed party.277 In the absence of such a penalty, a reasonable pa-
tent applicant will act strategically by withholding information about their 
reliance on TK and the source that provided such a resource. While the 
penalty for minimal and substantial reliance should be rejection of the ap-
plication, patent invalidity, or patent unenforceability, the penalty for 
those who only make minimal improvements should include fines or dis-
gorgement of profits. In the absence of harsher penalties than patent inva-
lidity, an applicant who knows their application would fail patentability 
examination would have little interest to disclose the damaging infor-
mation. The penalty in an ex post finding of noncompliance would be the 
same as the ex ante risk of withholding the information, and thus the re-
quirement would fail to produce the desired information-eliciting function. 
These suggestions about the forms of penalty are supported by the two 
goals of the requirement outlined in this Article—the ability of the require-
ment to compel socially beneficial information and its effect in reversing 
the rising protectionist trend.  
F. Who Should Have Standing? 
Patent rights, as “rights to exclude” others from making and using a 
claimed invention, have considerable public interest implications. As a re-
sult, the U.S. patent system allows third parties to challenge the validity or 
scope of patent rights based on a wide range of doctrines.278 Although the 
patent examiner is the first person who works to ensure the application 
  
 274. See Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on 
a European Community Biodiversity Directive, at 6, COM (1998) 42 final (Feb. 4, 1998),  
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:51998DC0042&from=EU. 
 275. See supra Section III.A. 
 276. See supra Section III.B. 
 277. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 37, at 123–24. 
 278. See 35 U.S.C. § 311 (2018) (inter partes review); 35 U.S.C. § 321 (post-grant review). 
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meets the patentability requirements, interested third parties are allowed, 
through many channels, to challenge the validity or scope of a claimed 
invention.279 The AIA has expanded the opportunity that third parties have 
to challenge patents before280 and after281 the patent has been granted.282 
Any party with a “legally cognizable injury” has standing to challenge a 
claim in a patent application or against a granted patent.283 This includes 
competitors of the applicant and third parties that may be affected by the 
potential enforcement of the patent right.  
Failure to comply with the requirement may impact competitors, 
source communities, and the public by granting exclusive patent rights to 
undeserving claims. Therefore, these stakeholders should have standing to 
bring a challenge against a patent that violates the requirement. Competi-
tors may be affected because the patentee may bring an infringement 
lawsuit against them after the patent issues. Source communities may be 
affected because the patentee may use the exclusive right in ways that af-
fect the traditional use of their TK or the importation of products based on 
the TK into the United States284 In case source communities are unable to 
bring a challenge, for example, because they are not well organized, the 
countries in which such communities reside should be able to bring a chal-
lenge. Furthermore, given the considerable public interest in the granting 
of an undeserving patent right, nongovernmental organizations and other 
entities working in the relevant industry (e.g., environmental conservation, 
agricultural management, biopharmaceutical research) should have 
standing to challenge a claimed invention for noncompliance with the re-
quirement. 
Consultation should be undertaken with all relevant stakeholders in-
cluding industry associations and leaders, indigenous peoples and local 
communities, and government agencies within and outside of the United 
States. The PTO could engage with other patent offices that have been 
implementing some version of a requirement that compels the disclosure 
of the source of TK used in research. The PTO can develop best practices 
and learn from challenges faced in other patent offices. Through the policy 
  
 279. For discussions on the changes brought about by the AIA and its implication for U.S. patent 
law, see Robert A. Armitage, Understanding the America Invents Act and Its Implications for Patent-
ing, 40 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 10 (2012). 
 280. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 8, 125 Stat. 284, 
315–16 (2011) (amending 35 U.S.C. § 122 to add a new subsection (e)). 
 281. Id. § 6, 125 Stat. 284, 299 (amending 35 U.S.C. § 321). 
 282. The AIA introduced Post-Grant Review (PGR), and Inter Partes Review (IPR); while Ex 
Parte Re-examination (EPR) was introduced in 1981. Id. 
 283. See John F. Duffy, Standing to Challenge Patents, Enforcement Risk, and Separation of 
Powers, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 628, 629 (2015). 
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guidance and institutional mechanisms outlined above, the PTO could in-
troduce an effective requirement that addresses concerns around legal un-
certainty and innovation-deterring burdens.  
G. How Would the Requirement Benefit Source Communities?  
An important question that may arise from the description of the re-
quirement provided in this Article is how the requirement may benefit 
source communities. An increasing number of source countries either have 
or are in the process of introducing domestic legislation285 that provide 
obligations around benefit sharing from the use of TK. Source countries 
can use the disclosure of reliance on TK provided in U.S. patent applica-
tions to track and enforce obligations of benefit sharing that are included 
in their domestic legislation. The requirement gives the laws of source 
countries some teeth by facilitating its enforcement. This, of course, re-
quires that the source country have domestic legislation that includes ob-
ligations of benefit sharing. Because U.S. courts enforce foreign judge-
ments in many areas of law,286 judgments based on violations of the source 
country’s benefit-sharing laws should be similarly enforced in the United 
States. 
CONCLUSION  
This Article has argued for the introduction of an explicit requirement 
in U.S. patent law that compels patent applicants to disclose the source of 
TK they used in their inventive process. While most of the literature has 
focused on the international aspect, this Article analyzed the costs and ben-
efits of introducing the requirement in the United States. The Article 
makes two arguments that should convince legislators to explicitly intro-
duce the requirement in U.S. patent law. First, the Article makes the nor-
mative case for conceiving the requirement as an information-forcing rule. 
Understood this way, the benefits of the requirement are that it would cre-
ate an efficient patent examination by eliciting socially beneficial infor-
mation about the validity and scope of a claimed application from the 
low-cost providers of such information—patent applicants.  
Second, the Article argues that explicitly introducing the requirement 
has potential to reverse a rising protectionist trend in which source com-
munities and countries are increasing restrictions on access to TK. This 
trend threatens to disrupt promising practices in which researchers build 
on TK resources to develop welfare-enhancing products and services. By 
granting source communities and countries the ability to track use of their 
TK and enforce domestic laws or contracts in which researchers have ob-
ligations, the requirement creates confidence in the patent system and en-
courages increased access and collaboration. 
  
 285. For a latest list of countries with some form of a requirement to disclose the source of TK 
used in the inventive process, see WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., supra note 250. 
 286. William C. Strum, Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 95 COM. L.J. 200, 201 (1990). 
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Conceiving the requirement as an information-forcing penalty rule 
provides key insights into what form the requirement should take to meet 
its goal of encouraging innovation while ensuring equitable sharing of 
benefits with source communities. The literature on information-forcing 
rules suggests that the requirement should only require patent applicants 
to disclose the source from which they received TK so as not to discourage 
them from engaging in TK-related research in the first place. The literature 
also suggests that if the requirement is to provide its information-forcing 
effect the penalty for nondisclosure should be a rejection of the patent ap-
plication and the invalidity or unenforceability of granted patents. 
To further address concerns about the requirement, the Article out-
lined three levels of reliance on TK that may have different implications 
for the duty to disclose. Minimal reliance on the resource in which the 
inventor is inspired by TK but develops the claimed invention inde-
pendently of TK should not trigger a duty under the requirement. How-
ever, “substantial reliance” in which the applicant would not have invented 
the claimed invention “but for” the reliance on TK should trigger an obli-
gation to disclose. Substantial reliance should include cases in which the 
use of TK resulted in the reduction of time or resources necessary to de-
velop a claimed invention.  
A carefully calibrated requirement that follows the guidelines out-
lined above can address concerns around legal uncertainty and the creation 
of innovation-deterring burdens. Introduction of the requirement in U.S. 
patent law could create a world in which researchers have increased access 
to TK resources, such as the 250,000 medical formulations in the Indian 
TK database, to develop products and services in return for an equitable 
sharing of benefits with source communities or countries. This is important 
for the U.S. economy considering the dominance of U.S. firms in sectors 
that rely on TK for part of their innovative output, including the biophar-
maceutical and agricultural industries. The Article advocates for amend-
ment of the federal rules and PTO manual as the most feasible channel to 
explicitly introduce the requirement, which, if carefully calibrated, would 
create more efficient patent examination and reverse the rising protection-
ist trend.  
 
